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Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and
Neglect Cases between Disposition and Permanency
JOSH GUPTA-KAGAN†
The government’s child protection agency removes a child from his
mother and convinces a family court judge to rule that the child’s mother
had neglected him. The family court judge orders the child into foster care
and orders the agency to work with the mother to remedy the conditions
that led her to neglect him with the plan of reunifying the child with her.
One year later, the family returns to family court. The social worker files a
report asserting that the mother has not cooperated with the agency’s
efforts to help her and remains incapable of taking care of the child. The
child has been in foster care for one year, and the social worker believes
the child needs a legally permanent home. The social worker recommends
that the court change the child’s plan to adoption by a new family.
At the court hearing, the mother says that she now can take care of her
child, but the social worker has never liked her and has not given her a fair
chance, nor has the worker given her credit for the progress she has made.
The mother knows she still has some problems, but she says they are less
severe than they were when her child was removed; she could help solve
them if only the social worker helped her, rather than trying to take her
child away. She says she tried to work with the social worker, but the
worker only referred her to other agencies that did not provide useful help.
How does the family court decide what happens next? A series of
factual disputes exist—whether and to what extent the mother has
remedied the conditions of neglect; whether the social worker has followed
the court’s order to help her; whether the social worker is biased against
her—that are distinct from the ruling that the court has already issued
regarding the mother’s past neglectful conduct. These factual disputes are
tied to legal questions—has the state agency made “reasonable efforts” to
reunify the child?1 Has the parent been sufficiently rehabilitated to be
entitled to the return of her child?2 Is reunification so unlikely that the
state agency should work to change the child’s custody arrangements
†

Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Senior Attorney, Children’s Law
Center, Washington, D.C., J.D. New York University School of Law. The opinions in this Article are
the Author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of his employers. The Author would like to
thank Sarah Bosken and Daniel Needham for research assistance, and Peter Edelman, Martin
Guggenheim, Erik Pitchal, and Vivek Sankaran for their comments on drafts.
1
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006) and text accompanying infra note 23.
2

See In re Knowack, 53 N.E. 676, 678 (N.Y. 1899) and text accompanying infra note 175.

14

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:1

3

permanently? These disputes appear tailor-made for a neutral fact-finder
to adjudicate based on time-tested rules of adversarial litigation.
A due process donut hole exists in the middle of abuse and neglect
cases. The beginnings and ends of abuse and neglect cases have traditional
due process protections. At the beginning, the government must prove that
a parent is unfit in a contested trial.4 At the end, the government, or a
petitioner for adoption, guardianship or some other form of permanent
custody must prove their case in a trial.5 But what happens in the middle is
quite a different story. In tens (and perhaps hundreds) of thousands of
child abuse and neglect cases, judges decide to change children’s
permanency plans based solely on the representations of parties, social
workers, and attorneys—not actual evidence—and without giving the
parties the ability to appeal the judge’s decision.6 Parties who want a
permanency plan that is different from what the judge orders will have no
choice but to wait to challenge the plan. They can wait until the next
hearing, but they will face the same procedures as in the first hearing.
They can wait until a termination of parental rights or some other
permanent custody case is filed and then litigate whether the parent is able
to care for the child. But by then, much time will have passed, new facts
may emerge regarding the parent’s ability to raise the child—facts that
have been shaped by the permanency plan decision itself—and the child
may have developed strong new bonds with potential permanent
caretakers, adding emotional and legal difficulties.
Abuse and neglect cases involve constantly changing facts. They “are
unlike civil cases, which typically involve only facts gone by . . . The
ultimate parties in interest are the [children] themselves. And for them,
their lives are . . . ongoing event[s].”7 A child’s need to return to his parent
may ebb or flow. His parent’s fitness may improve, regress, or remain the
same. Federal law, followed in all states that wish to receive federal funds
to support foster care, requires regular permanency hearings so family
courts can make decisions based on evolving factual situations. These
decisions, and the lack of greater procedural protections around them, are
3
4
5
6

See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(i) (2006) and text accompanying infra note 21.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).

I describe what occurs in tens of thousands of abuse and neglect cases, but many states provide
more procedural protections. Many require evidentiary hearings for permanency plan decisions and
many permit appeals. A detailed fifty-one-state survey is included in Part I.B.2. See infra Part I.B.2.
7
In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413, 420 (D.C. 2009). The D.C. Court of Appeals stated this language in a
different context—ordering a “fresh assessment of the present situation” in the remand of an adoption
case involving children in foster care. Id. But its fundamental point—that facts in foster care cases
change as quickly as children do, and trial court decisions need to take account of these changing
facts—applies to other procedural postures.
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the focus of this Article. These decisions are important because they can
set the course of children’s life for years, if not their entire childhood.
They are also designed to create the real-life facts that will lead to
achieving the permanency plan chosen; thus, they shape the “ongoing
events” that will become the factual basis of later termination of parental
rights or other permanency trials.
The absence of greater procedural protections in hundreds of thousands
of abuse and neglect cases that reach this middle stage leads to poor
decisions in abuse and neglect cases; creates unnecessary harm to children
even when incorrect decisions are reversed later in a case; and, at least in
some cases, violates the due process rights of parents and arguably of
children. The federal government (which created the legal structure that
states follow to obtain foster care funding), state legislatures that write
laws governing abuse and neglect cases, and state courts adjudicating
abuse and neglect cases should change child abuse and neglect laws to
address these problems.
Part I of this Article will outline existing due process protections in
abuse and neglect cases, particularly those protections that exist between
an initial adjudication of abuse or neglect and a final decree permanently
affecting a child’s relationship with his or her parent, including those
protections required by federal law and states’ implementation of those
protections. Part II addresses the argument that due process requires more
meaningful procedures. Part III will explain the policy argument—beyond
the due process considerations of Part II—that support meaningful trial
court procedures and appellate rights. Part IV will also discuss why
alternative means of filling this due process donut hole fail to satisfy policy
concerns.
I. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES
A. The beginnings and ends of cases
Lawyers unfamiliar with abuse and neglect law would feel comfortable
walking into trials held at the beginnings and ends of abuse or neglect
cases. They would see bench trials that have the due process hallmarks of
most civil litigation.8 A case typically begins with the government
formally charging a parent with abusing or neglecting his or her child and
asking a judge to put the child in the government’s custody so it can
protect the child from further abuse or neglect.9 In constitutional terms, the
government must prove that the parent is unfit to justify changing
8
9

See, e.g. D.C. CODE § 16-2316(a) (LexisNexis 2001).
See, e.g. D.C. CODE § 16-2305 (LexisNexis 2001) (governing abuse and neglect petitions).
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custody.
The government, like any other party seeking to prove a case
that it files, puts on witnesses and introduces evidence. Opposing parties
cross-examine the government’s witnesses, challenge its evidence, and can
put on their own case.11 The judge considers the evidence presented, his or
her state’s substantive law and relevant constitutional law, and then enters
a ruling, which parties may appeal.
A ruling that parents have abused or neglected their children justifies a
temporary remedy—typically, placing a child in foster care—but a second
trial is necessary to permanently alter a child’s custodial arrangements,
such as a termination of parental rights trial, adoption trial, or some other
form of permanent custody trial (what I will call a “permanency trial”).12
Here, too, abuse and neglect cases follow normal procedures. Parties
seeking to terminate a parent’s rights must prove their case by clear and
convincing evidence.13 That case includes proving not merely a single act
of parental unfitness, but that the parent has not ameliorated his or her
unfitness and, therefore, a showing of permanent deprivation is required.14
Parties have the opportunity to challenge each other’s evidence and present
their own. States treat such trials very seriously; even without a
constitutional mandate to provide counsel,15 the vast majority of states now
do so.16 Judges consider the evidence and the law and make their ruling,
which can be appealed by the parties.
B. The donut hole in between
In most states, those same lawyers who felt at home in a neglect or
permanency trial would be confused if they observed a hearing in between
the initial abuse and neglect trial and a permanency trial. They would see
10
11

See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

See, e.g. D.C. CODE § 16-2316(b) (LexisNexis 2001) (discussing evidentiary standards for
“fact finding hearings”).
12
Those other forms are discussed below. See infra notes 287, 296 and accompanying text.
13
14
15
16

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
See id. at 760 n.10.
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981).

By one count, thirty-nine states now provide a right to counsel in all TPR proceedings, and six
other states have enacted laws providing a right to counsel in some TPR proceedings. Those numbers
reflect an increase from when Lassiter was decided; then, thirty-three states provided for a right to
counsel in TPR proceedings. Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the
Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697, 701 n.29 (2006). By another
more recent count, forty-four states provide an absolute statutory right to counsel in TPR proceedings
and six provide counsel in some TPR proceedings. VIVEK SANKARAN, A NATIONAL SURVEY ON A
PARENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND DEPENDENCY CASES,
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/ccl/specialprojects/Documents/National%20Survey%2
0on%20a%20Parent’s%20Right%20to%20Counsel.pdf (last visited June 29, 2010).
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permanency hearings featuring discussion of facts not proven at any trial.
In about thirty states,17 parties would not be required to call individuals to
the witness stand and would, instead, assert facts, including many loaded
with hearsay, from counsel tables and through written reports not subject to
cross-examination. Disputes regarding the facts might exist, but that
would not necessarily trigger adversarial fact finding. Purported experts
might interpret purported facts a certain way, and multiple purported
experts might offer conflicting opinions. The judge would then make
decisions about “plans” and “efforts” in the case and order parties to work
towards the plan that the judge set. The judge would speak as if the plan
she set is the final plan for the child, and the parties could not appeal this
ruling. These permanency hearings might even refer to prior permanency
hearings held in previous years, with no change other than the passage of
time.
Those lawyers might have the same reaction that, as one commentator
has described, many children and adults who are the subjects of abuse and
neglect cases have: “This is a courtroom?”18
1. Federal statutory “procedural safeguards” between disposition and
permanency
These permanency hearings are creatures of statute. Federal law
requires, as a condition of federal funding, that all states to comply with
certain minimal procedures in abuse and neglect cases. Foster care
agencies must complete a “case plan” describing the child’s foster care
placement and how the agency will work with the child and parents to
facilitate reunification—or, if the agency is working towards another
permanent custody or adoption with someone else, how the agency will
work to do so.19 State courts must hold a “permanency hearing” after the
17
18

See infra Part I.B.2.a.

Professor Erik Pitchal, describing the several years he spent practicing in Brooklyn Family
Court, wrote:
“More than one youngster, eyes bulging at the wonder of it all, blurted out,
‘This is the courtroom?’ Whether from watching Judge Judy on television or
from their own mind’s eye of fantastical construction, they had a far different
expectation for what a courtroom would look like. Even the older adolescents
were surprised—often at the dingy, disrespectful nature of the physical space.
What they could not know was that many adults had the same reaction—to the
physical space, to be sure, but more critically, to what happened there on a daily
basis.”
Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 663, 684 (2006).
19
42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (2006). See also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (2006) (providing for the
development of case plans).
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child has lived in foster care for fourteen months, and every year
thereafter.20 At this hearing, the judge must determine the child’s
“permanency plan”—that is, whether the plan of the case is for the child to
return to his or her parent, to be adopted, to live in the permanent custody
of someone else, or to grow up in foster care.21 This determination
includes deciding, “whether, and if applicable when, the child will be
returned to the parent,” including, in appropriate cases, an order that a
child should be returned to the parent immediately.22
When the child is not returned to the parent immediately, the judge
selects a permanency plan at a permanency hearing, and this plan mandates
what work the state agency must do. The state must make “reasonable
efforts” to bring to fruition the result identified in the permanency plan. As
a default, states must make reasonable efforts to reunify children with the
parents or guardians from whom they were removed. 23 When a judge sets
a different permanency plan, states must make reasonable efforts to
“complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize” that permanency plan
in a “timely manner.”24
States’ federal funding depends on their obtaining a judicial finding
that they made reasonable efforts to reunify children or to implement and
finalize another permanency plan. These findings must occur on the same
schedule on which permanency plans are held: within fourteen months of
the child’s removal and placement in foster care and every year after that.25
If a judge does not find that a state has made the required reasonable
efforts, the state cannot obtain federal funds for that child until a judge has
found that the agency has at a later point made the required efforts.26
Federal law does require some “procedural safeguards” at these
permanency hearings but is light on detail regarding what “safeguards” are
required: “[P]rocedural safeguards shall be applied with respect to parental
rights pertaining to the removal of the child from the home of his parents,
to a change in the child’s placement, and to any determination affecting
20

Id. § 675(5)(C)(i) (2006). The first permanency hearing must occur within twelve months of
the child’s “entry into foster care.” Id. This is defined as the earlier of a judicial finding that the child
was abused or neglected or sixty days after the child was removed from the child’s parent or other
caregiver. Id. § 675(5)(F) (2006). Therefore, under no circumstances can a child remain in foster care
for longer than twelve months plus sixty days without a permanency hearing.
21
Id. § 675(5)(C)(i) (2006).
22
23
24
25

Id. See also D.C. Code § 16-2323(f) (LexisNexis 2001).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006).
Id. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2006).

45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i) (2009). Federal Regulations require such findings within 12
months of the date the child is considered to have “entered” foster care, which is defined as up to 60
days after the child’s removal. Id. See also 45 C.F.R § 1355.20(a) (2009).
26
Id. § 1356.21(b)(2)(ii) (2009).
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visitation privileges of parents.”
Federal law provides slightly more
detail in requiring that children should be “consult[ed], in an age
appropriate manner” regarding their permanency plans.28
Federal
regulations provide no further guidance on the “procedural safeguards”
that should exist at permanency hearings or regarding reasonable efforts
findings.29
The legislative history behind these provisions is similarly short on
detail regarding the envisioned procedures. The “procedural safeguards”
requirement was born in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980.30 Congress expressed concern that “many children, because of the
inadequacies of current review procedures, and lack of family reunification
services, become ‘lost’ in foster care, and continue to remain in care
unnecessarily at great cost to the government, themselves and their
families.”31 Congress thus required states to hold dispositional hearings
when a child has been in foster care for eighteen months and, for each such
child,
assess the appropriateness of their placement . . .
determine whether the child should be returned to his or
her home; whether the child requires continued placement
. . . whether the child should be placed with a legal
guardian; whether proceedings should be initiated to
terminate parents’ custody rights so the child can be free
for adoption; or whether a child should be placed in
permanent long-term foster care placement because the
child cannot or should not be returned home or placed in
an adoptive home.”32
Congress, through the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of
1997,33 shortened the timeline, before these “procedural safeguards” are
applied, from eighteen to twelve months. The House Committee that
drafted the bill explained “that 18 months is a very long time in the life of a
young child” and faster hearings are required to prevent “unnecessarily

27
28
29
30

42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(ii) (2006).
Id. § 675(5)(C)(iii) (2006).
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355–56 (2009).

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 101(a), 94 Stat.
511 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(ii) (2006)).
31
H. R. REP. NO. 96-136, at 50 (1979).
32
33

Id.
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
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prolonged stays in foster care.”
The Committee emphasized its
expectation that the decisions at this first permanency hearing will be
“final permanency decisions,”35 a point underscored by Congress’s
decision to change the name of the hearings from “dispositional hearings”
to “permanency hearings.”36 Congress’s intention was for permanency
hearings to speed actual permanency; a judge would set a permanency plan
and that permanency plan would be realized in relatively short order—a
goal that has not been achieved.37 Congress did not, however, provide any
new guidance as to the “procedural safeguards” that should occur at these
permanency hearings.
While the statutory text and legislative history do not illuminate what
procedures are envisioned, they do help shed light on what permanency
hearings are designed to accomplish. These hearings call upon judges to
make both legal and factual conclusions that are distinct from the finding
of abuse or neglect that justified the child’s entry into foster care. A judge
must decide, first, whether the child can go home or if he needs to remain
in foster care, and, if the latter, whether the location in which the agency
has placed the child is appropriate.38 That is, the judge decides where the
child will live in the immediate future, something that cannot be done at
the time a judge orders a child to be placed for the first time. Second,
when the child will remain in foster care, the judge should decide what
permanent custody arrangement the child should have in the future—
whether he should return to the family from whom he was removed or
whether a different permanency plan should be followed.39 This
determination is based as much on developments since the child’s entry
into foster care as it is based on the underlying adjudication of parental
unfitness. It stands to reason that both of these determinations would be
informed by analyzing the adequacy of the foster care agency’s case plan
and the parent’s compliance (or lack thereof) with the case plan—although
the federal law does not so state, at least not explicitly. Indeed, an
illustrative state law provides that when a judge decides whether a child
should return home to her parent at a permanency hearing,
the court shall view the failure of the parent to
substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the
case service plan . . . as evidence that return of the child to
34
35
36
37
38
39

H. R. REP. NO. 105-77, pt. 2, at 13 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745–46.
Id.
Adoption and Safe Families Act § 302.
See infra Part I.B.3.
42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B) (2006).
Id. § 675(5)(C)(i) (2006).
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his or her parent would cause a substantial risk of harm to
the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.40
Moreover, following the ASFA amendments, these hearings are
supposed to be final determinations of these issues, as the foster care
agency is expected to work to achieve promptly the identified permanency
plan.41 Timeliness is crucial, especially, as ASFA’s legislative history
indicates, in cases involving children.42 Third, the judge should decide
whether the foster care agency has made reasonable efforts to achieve the
previously set permanency plan.43
2. State laws governing procedures between disposition and
permanency
Eric Washington, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals (the District’s highest court), was formerly a trial judge in the
District of Columbia Superior Court44 and described the procedures for
permanency plan changes in this way:
Thinking back to my time as a trial judge, I remember
a social worker or somebody coming in and arguing that
the individual who had been adjudicated neglectful or
stipulated to neglect had once again failed to do something
they had been ordered to do by the court and therefore they
were recommending that the goal should be changed. I
was never sure if there was a requirement or a notice that
was given that at this hearing we are going to be
discussing a change in goal.45
Chief Judge Washington’s confusion is understandable. The District’s
permanency hearing statute requires the foster care agency to submit a
report at least ten days in advance of a permanency hearing, but does not
40
41
42
43
44

MICH. COMP. LAWS. SERV. § 712A.19a(5) (LexisNexis 2005).
H. R. REP. NO. 105-77, pt. 2, at 13 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745–46.
Id.
See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i) (2009) and text accompanying note 25.

Chief Judge Washington served as a trial judge from 1995 to his appointment as an appellate
judge in 1999. Bio for the Honorable Eric T. Washington, Chief Judge, District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, available at http://www.dcappeals.gov/dccourts/docs/DCCA_Bio_Washington.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2010).
45
Audio tape: In re S.M., Oral Argument, (on file with author) quote near 11:43:10 in the
recording. This case and the context of the quote are discussed further in Part II.A. Chief Judge
Washington used the term “goal” to refer to a child’s permanency plan.
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explicitly require a statement of the agency’s recommended plans.46 The
statute is silent regarding any advance notice of plan change requests from
other parties, such as the child’s guardian ad litem,47 or a foster parent who
may have been made a party or be granted the right to attend and be heard
at a permanency hearing.48
Chief Judge Washington’s confusion could reasonably extend to how
trial court judges are supposed to adjudicate contested permanency plan
decisions. The District’s permanency hearing statute is silent as to the
substantive standard to be applied, which party bears the burden of proof,
and how the court is to adjudicate contested facts. The District statute
detailing when evidentiary hearings are required, and what rules of
evidence shall be applied in such hearings, refers to trials on a neglect
petition and the dispositional hearings that shortly follow adjudications of
neglect, but does not refer to permanency hearings.49
One element of District of Columbia permanency hearing procedures
is clear: a trial court’s permanency plan decision, no matter what
procedural, substantive, or evidentiary objections a party may make, is not
an appealable order.50
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges—a
membership organization of courts handling abuse, neglect, juvenile
delinquency and other cases, which provides “technical assistance” to
judges nationwide51—has issued guidance for permanency hearings that
echoes the law in the District of Columbia. The Council urges judges to
make detailed, written findings of fact and conclusions of law, including
46

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2323(d) (LexisNexis 2001). In 2004, after Chief Judge Washington
became an appellate judge, the Superior Court issued rules that require foster care agency reports to
state a recommended permanency plan. D.C. Sup. Ct. Neg. R. 33(b). In this author’s experience
practicing in the District of Columbia Family Court, the required reports typically do contain the
agency’s recommended permanency plan, but are frequently filed only two or three days in advance of
permanency hearings, rather than the ten days required by statute, thus affecting the notice provided
other parties.
47
In the District of Columbia, a foster child is appointed a “guardian ad litem,” an attorney who
“shall in general be charged with the representation of the child’s best interest.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 162304(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2001). By representing the child’s best interests and not the child him or
herself, the guardian ad litem may request a plan change contrary to the child’s wishes. According to
one recent compilation, the District is one of fifty-four states and other American territories that
provide a best interest representative to the child, some of which also provide a lawyer for children in
all cases or provide discretion for judges to appoint such lawyers. REPRESENTING CHILDREN
WORLDWIDE, U.S. SUMMARY CHART, http://www.law.yale.edu/RCW/rcw/summary.htm (last visited
Oct. 24, 2010).
48
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2001).
49
50
51

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(b) (LexisNexis 2001).
In re K.M.T., 795 A.2d 688, 690 (D.C. 2002).

See generally NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, http://www.ncjfcj.org/
content/view/15/75/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
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whether the state agency has made reasonable efforts to help the family
reunify, and what the child’s permanency plan will be.52 The Council has
admonished members that permanency hearing findings should be “more
specific, final and definitive than at a review hearing.”53 But the Council’s
description of permanency hearing lacks any reference to examination of
witnesses, documentary evidence, or other trial-type procedures. The
Council also does not specify what detailed factual findings would justify a
particular permanency plan ruling.54 Instead, the Council writes that state
agencies should propose their recommended permanency plans to all
parties in advance of hearings and that other parties should “submit a
report” if they disagree with the state’s proposal.55 Such reports “should
set out facts to support” the party’s position.56 The Council’s guidance
includes no discussion as to how courts are to determine which party’s
view of the facts is accurate.57 Nor does the Council suggest how to
respond to delayed or incomplete agency reports—which, as a recent study
of New York City family court cases found, were the biggest causes of
delayed permanency hearings.58
The Council’s guidance also includes no suggestion that permanency
hearing rulings are subject to appeal. Its guidance speaks of “appeals from
adoptions and terminations of parental rights,” but not appeals of
permanency hearing decisions.59
In addition to the federally-required permanency hearings, many states
require “review of disposition” hearings, and these review hearings often
overlap with permanency hearing requirements.60 A survey of the variety
52

BARBARA SEIBEL, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ADOPTION &
PERMANENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 22
(2000) [hereinafter ADOPTION & PERMANENCY GUIDELINES].
53
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING
COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 80 (1995) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDELINES].
54
ADOPTION & PERMANENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 52, at 19.
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id. at 17–23.

CHILDREN’S RTS., THE LONG ROAD HOME: A STUDY OF CHILDREN STRANDED IN NEW YORK
CITY FOSTER CARE 192–94 (2009), available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wpcontent/uploads//2009/11/ 2009-1102_long_road_home_full_report_
final.pdf. Fifty-five percent of cases studied included at least one “permanency hearing not completed
timely.” Id. at 192. In these cases, reports were untimely 48 percent of the time and incomplete 20
percent of the time. Id. at 193–94.
59
ADOPTION & PERMANENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 52, at 38.
60

See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2323(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2001) (requiring review hearings
every six months to determine the “continuing necessity” of placement, level of compliance with a case
plan, and a date when the child’s permanency plan will be achieved); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
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of practice regarding different states’ review hearing laws and practices is
beyond the scope of this Article, as they are not rooted in federal statutory
law and are thus less easy to generalize. To the extent that review hearings
under a particular state’s law have an impact similar to permanency
hearings, arguments made in this Article apply with full force.
Although significant state-by-state variation exists, the law of the
District of Columbia and the recommendations summarized by the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges are illustrative.
This section will next summarize trial and appellate court permanency
hearing procedures throughout the United States.
a. Trial court procedures
Like the federal law that requires permanency hearings and like the
District of Columbia laws referred to by Chief Judge Washington, many
states’ laws provide little guidance regarding how trial courts should
decide a child’s permanency plan or whether the state agency has made
reasonable efforts to achieving the child’s existing plan.
States with statutes similar to the District of Columbia’s—that is,
statutes that require permanency hearings to be held but do not provide
guidance regarding when, if ever, such hearings should receive contested
evidence—include: Alabama,61 Alaska,62 Arkansas,63 Colorado,64
Delaware,65 Florida,66 Hawaii,67 Idaho,68 Indiana,69 Kansas,70 Maine,71
712A.19 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring review hearings to occur as frequently as every ninety-one days
to determine necessity of continued foster care and level of compliance with case plan).
61
ALA. CODE § 12-15-315 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). The Alabama statute refers to taking
testimony in hearings to determine if a child was abused or neglected, but not permanency hearings.
ALA. CODE § 12-15-311 (b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
62
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(f) & (l) (2008) (requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard but
providing no guidance regarding resolving factual disputes); Owen M. v. State, 120 P.3d 201 (Alaska
2005) (upholding permanency plan decision made without evidentiary hearing).
63
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338 (2009).
64

COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-702 (2010). In re M.B., 70 P.3d 618, 624 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting
the statute’s silence regarding permanency hearing procedures and suggesting parent’s due process
rights at permanency hearings are “minimal”).
65
DEL. FAM. CT. CIV. R. 216–217. Permanency hearings are not governed by Delaware statute.
66
67

FLA. STAT. § 39.621 (2007).

2010 Haw. Sess. Laws, 70–74. Hawaii’s legislature recently amended its statute to “ensure
compliance with federal Title IV-E State Plan requirements.” Haw. S. Comm. Rep. 2312 (2010),
available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2010/CommReports/SB2716_SD1_SSCR2312_.
htm. Hawaii’s law does not go beyond the federal legislation with which its legislature wanted to
comply in terms of meaningful guidance for the conduct of permanency hearings.
68
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1622 (2010).
69
70

IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-34-21-5, 31-34-21-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-2263, 38-2264, 38-2265 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
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Massachusetts,
Minnesota,
Mississippi,
Missouri,
Montana,76
77
78
79
80
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota,81
Pennsylvania,82 Rhode Island,83 South Dakota,84 Texas,85 Washington,86
West Virginia,87 Wisconsin,88 and Wyoming.89 Arizona’s statute refers to
71
72

73

74

75

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4038-B (2010).

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29B (West Supp. 2010). Massachusetts court rules
provide that the agency must submit a report to the court in advance of a permanency hearing and that
the case worker who wrote that report “shall be available for cross-examination by each of the parties.”
MASS. TRIAL CT. UNIF. RULES FOR PERMANENCY HEARINGS 6(F). The rules, however, are silent
regarding a party’s ability to put on any evidence of his own.
73
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.201 (Subd. 11–11a) (West Supp. 2010).
74
75
76
77
78

MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-613 (2009).
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.720 (2010).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-445 (2010).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1312(3) (2008).

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62E.170 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). The court may “[r]equire a
written report from the child’s protective services officer, welfare worker or other guardian of the child
which includes, but is not limited to, an evaluation of the progress of the child and recommendations
for further supervision, treatment or rehabilitation.” Id.
79
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:24-b (2010).
80

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-61.2(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2010). New Jersey’s statute requires the
Court to “consider[] and evaluat[e]” information provided by all parties, but makes no mention of
whether such information is to be provided through evidentiary means, or tested by cross examination.
Id. § 30:4C-61.2(c). In addition, the statutory list of “information” to be considered relates to proposed
permanency plans and services for children and families and does not include any reference to a
parent’s continuing (or not) unfitness or a parent’s compliance (or not) with the state agency’s case
plan. Id.
81
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02(15), 27-20-36(2)(b) (Supp. 2009).
82

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6351(e)–(f.2) (West Supp. 2010). The Pennsylvania statute refers
to receiving evidence regarding “aggravated circumstances,” § 6351(e)(2), and evidence of drug or
alcohol abuse by a parent, § 6352(f.2), but not to other evidence regarding a parent’s fitness or any
other factual dispute which may exist. The absence of any such references to evidence is all the more
striking given the specific references to evidence of substance abuse and aggravated circumstances.
83
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1 (2006). Rhode Island law instructs courts to permit each party
an opportunity to present “a report, oral or written, containing recommendations as to the best interest
of the child,” but makes no reference to evidentiary standards. § 40-11-12.1(c).
84
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.2 (Supp. 2010).
85

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.301–263.307 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010). The Texas statute
permits parties to submit reports, but does not refer to evidence or testimony to establish or challenge
facts asserted in such reports. Id. § 263.303(c) (West Supp. 2010).
86
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.145 (West Supp. 2010).
87

Under West Virginia law, an evidentiary hearing may be held when a party requests a change
in disposition. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-6 (LexisNexis 2009). But West Virginia law does not
provide for evidentiary hearings regarding permanency plans. §§ 49-6-5a, 49-6-8 (LexisNexis 2009).
88
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.38(5m) (West Supp. 2009). This statute permits individuals to “be
heard at the hearing” but does not suggest that “be[ing] heard” means the opportunity to put on or
challenge evidence or, indeed, anything other than an opportunity to state one’s position. Id.
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some sort of evidence being heard at permanency hearings—and not
merely reports from parties—but without much detail regarding what
evidence would be admissible or under what procedures.90
Some states have, by statute or case law, provided clearer guidance on
the procedures at permanency hearings. New Mexico law, for instance,
provides that all parties at a permanency hearing have a right to present
evidence and call and cross-examine witnesses, but the rules of evidence
do not generally apply (permitting witnesses to testify to hearsay and other
evidence that would be inadmissible in other hearings).91 States with
similar laws include California,92 Connecticut,93 Illinois,94 Iowa,95
Kentucky,96 Louisiana,97 Maryland,98 Michigan,99 New York,100 North
Carolina,101 Ohio,102 Oklahoma,103 Oregon,104 South Carolina,105
89
90

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-431 (2009).

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-862(G) (Supp. 2009) (“Evidence considered by the court in
making a decision pursuant to this section also shall include any substantiated allegations of abuse or
neglect committed in another jurisdiction.”).
91
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-25.1(B), (I) (Supp. 2010).
92

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.22, 366.25 (West Supp. 2010) (referring in multiple
locations to evidence at permanency hearings).
93
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(k)(1) (2007).
94
95

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/52-28 (West 2007).

IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.104(1)(c) (West Supp. 2010). Section 232.104(1)(c) provides that
permanency hearings must be held in “substantial conformance” with section 232.99(2), which
provides evidentiary standards. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.99(2) (West 2006).
96
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.125(4)–(5) (West 2006).
97
98

LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 702, 709 (2004 & Supp. 2010).

Maryland’s statute contains no guidance. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-823
(LexisNexis 2006). However, Maryland cases reflect the requirement that evidentiary hearings to be
held. See, e.g., In re Ashley E., 854 A.2d 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (describing evidentiary
procedures and rules applied at a permanency hearing).
99
The Michigan statute provides little guidance. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712A.19a.(12)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010). Michigan court rules permit parties to cross-examine witnesses and submit
evidence, though the rules include “reports” as such evidence. MICH. CT. R. 3.976(D).
100
N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW §§ 1089(d), 1046(c) (McKinney 2010) (providing rules of evidence
for permanency hearings).
101
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-907(b)–(c) (2001) (referring to the court’s consideration of any
relevant and credible evidence and requiring written findings of fact).
102
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.417(F) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). The Ohio statute instructs
the court to “summon every interested party to appear at the review hearing and give them an
opportunity to testify and to present other evidence,” but no standard of evidence is given. Id.
103
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-811(A)(4) (West 2009). See also In re B.T.W., 195 P.3d
896, 904–07 (Okla. 2008) (summarizing testimony taken).
104
OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.476(1) (2009).
105

S.C. CODE ANN. § 63–7–1700(C)–(D) (Supp. 2008) (requiring family court to hold an
evidentiary hearing when requested by a party). See also Ex Parte Morris, 624 S.E.2d 649, 653 (S.C.
2006) (“[T]he permanency planning process set forth . . . involves the long-term custody of a child, the
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109

Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
One state, Georgia, requires evidentiary hearings only in certain
circumstances, such as when an agency proposes ceasing reunification
efforts and moving towards an alternative permanency plan.110
The standards (or lack thereof) summarized above govern all decisions
made at permanency hearings, including both permanency plan decisions
and decisions whether administrative agencies have made reasonable
efforts to achieve a child’s existing permanency plan. It is not surprising,
therefore, that state courts’ implementation of federal “reasonable efforts”
requirements has faced criticism as substance-free rubber stamp decisions
by state judges—a significant problem given the importance of reasonable
efforts in the federal statutory scheme111 and the unavailability of federal
remedies to enforce states’ reasonable efforts obligations.112 In the absence
of a federal definition of the term or adequate federal funding for
prevention or reunification services, “judicial findings of reasonable efforts
are often made by judges by rote.”113 One study of 463 New York City
cases involving children who had been in foster care for at least two years,
and thus lacked legal permanency for a significant period of time, revealed
that judges found that the government had made reasonable efforts to reach
permanency in 457 cases.114 When such decisions cannot be appealed until
the end of a case—when an adoption decree or termination of parental
rights decision is entered—appellate judges face strong incentives to avoid
close examination of reasonable efforts decisions.
Overturning a
permanency decision based on the lack of reasonable efforts earlier in the
case could “upset stability for a child who has been previously neglected or
potential termination of parental rights, and the possible adoption of the child in the future. Decisions
regarding matters of such import must be made after careful, deliberate consideration of admissible
evidence and sworn testimony presented by interested parties and witnesses at an evidentiary
hearing.”).
106
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-403(a)(4)(A), 37-2-409(b)(5) (2005 & Supp. 2009).
107
108
109

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-314(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5321(f) (Supp. 2009).

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-282(A)–(D) (2010). The Virginia statute envisions that permanency
hearings will follow a petition proposing a permanency plan by thirty days, and instructs judges to
make decisions “upon the proof adduced.” §16.1-282(D) (2010). Virginia cases reflect evidentiary
hearings. See, e.g., Williams v. Hampton Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 1017-02-1, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS
647, at *2–3 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002) (describing a parent’s testimony on her own behalf).
110
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-58(h) (West Supp. 2009).
111

See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i) (2009); 45 C.F.R § 1355.20(a) (2009); 45 C.F.R. §
1356.21(b)(2)(ii) (2009). See also text accompanying supra notes 25–26.
112
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
113

Deborah Paruch, The Orphaning of Underprivileged Children: America’s Failed Child
Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119, 138 (2006).
114
CHILDREN’S RTS, supra note 58, at 192.
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abused. In such circumstances, courts may find it easier to rule that
reasonable efforts need only mean meager or pro-forma efforts.”115 Even
when the reasonableness of a state’s efforts to reunify a family is
questionable, when that question is only raised at the end of a case—for
instance, when an adoption is on appeal and a child has finally left foster
care to a permanent family—reviewing courts feel pressure to avoid
“punish[ing the child] for the alleged wrongs of the bureaucracy.”116
A significant and unsurprising overlap exists between those states that
do not provide parents an absolute right to counsel in abuse and neglect
cases and those whose statutes do not require judges to base permanency
hearing decisions on evidence. Professor Vivek Sankaran counts twelve
states that do not provide an absolute right to counsel, ten of which appear
in the above list of states that provide no guidance regarding hearing
competing evidence at permanency hearings.117 Of the thirty-nine states
and the District of Columbia who do provide an absolute right to
counsel,118 twenty provide no guidance regarding evidence at permanency
hearings.119 In percentage terms, 83 percent of states that do not provide
an absolute right to counsel also do not require evidence at permanency
hearings. In contrast, 51 percent of states that provide an absolute right to
counsel do not require evidence at permanency hearings. A full
exploration of the right to counsel throughout a dependency case is beyond
the scope of this Article, except to note the correlation between the right to
counsel and the right to put on and challenge evidence, and thus between
states that have disregarded “[i]nformed opinion [which] has clearly come
to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed
115

Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 103 (2009).
116
In re L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 882 (D.C. 1995) (quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis
removed). See also generally David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child
Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 139 (1992).
117
Those states are Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. Sankaran, supra note 16. The two states which do not provide an
absolute right to counsel but require some evidence to be heard at permanency hearings are Oregon and
Vermont. Compare Sankaran, supra note 16, with DEL. FAM. CT. R. CIV. P. 216–217; 2010 Haw. Sess.
Laws, 70–74; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1622 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-34-21-5, 31-34-21-7
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.201 (Subd. 11-11a) (West Supp. 2010); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-21-613 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.720 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62E.170
(LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-61.2(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
48.38(5m) (West Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.476(1) (2009); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 §
5321(f) (Supp. 2009).
118
See Sankaran, supra note 16.
119

See Sankaran, supra note 16 (This section counts thirty-one states and the District of
Columbia in this category. Ten of those are listed in note 117).
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120

counsel . . . in dependency and neglect proceedings” and those that do
not see the value in basing permanency hearing decisions on evidence.
b. Appealing permanency hearing orders
A significant split exists between states regarding the ability to appeal
permanency hearing orders. At least twelve states plus the District of
Columbia explicitly bar such appeals, three states bar them with narrow
exceptions, thirteen explicitly permit them in at least some cases, and at
least one state court has noted conflicting opinions within that jurisdiction.
The remaining twenty-one states do not have clear case law on point—an
absence of clear authority which itself suggests that few, if any, parties or
attorneys in those states have even tried to appeal permanency hearing
orders. Taken together, this breakdown of state laws on the ability to
appeal permanency hearing orders suggests that the majority of states have
either concluded that no right to appeal exists or have not addressed the
questions. It is my hope that these states, in particular, consider the
arguments in this Article.
Among states that do not permit parties to appeal permanency hearing
orders, the most frequent analysis is that such decisions are not final
orders, thus appellate courts lack jurisdiction over appeals of these
orders.121 The policy concern animating this approach is that taking the
time to appeal such plans makes little sense when trial courts face strict
federal law timelines for moving towards permanency. An Arizona
appellate court worried that permitting such appeals “would undermine the
primary purpose of ASFA and [conforming Arizona law]: expediting the
process of finding permanent placement for children.”122 That court did
not discuss the reality that we have already seen—that even with ASFA
timelines, a significant number of children remain in foster care for an
extended period of time without a permanent legal change of status.
States, like Arizona, that have held that permanency plan orders are not
appealable include: Alaska,123 Colorado,124 the District of Columbia,125
Illinois,126 Indiana,127 Kansas,128 Kentucky,129 Maine,130 Missouri,131
120
121
122
123

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981).
See, e.g., In re K.M.T., 795 A.2d 688 (D.C. 2002).
Rita J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 1 P.3d 155, 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).

Nicole H. v. Alaska Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., No. S-11974, 2006 WL 895084, at *6
(Alaska April 5, 2006) (“Because permanency hearings commonly resolve interlocutory issues, orders
resulting from such hearings typically cannot be appealed as a matter of right.”).
124
In re. H.R., 883 P.2d 619, 621 (Colo. App. 1994).
125
126

In re K.M.T., 795 A.2d 688 (D.C. 2002).

In re A.H., 802 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2003). Illinois courts have held permanency plan orders
appealable only when issued as part of otherwise appealable orders, such as a dispositional order. In re
Faith B., 832 N.E.2d 152, 161 (Ill. 2005).
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133

Nebraska,
Texas.
Utah generally does not permit appeals of
permanency plan decisions, but does when a plan is changed from
reunification with a parent to long-term foster care.134
Some states do not follow this general rule and permit some
immediate appeals. Maryland, for instance, permits appeals from trial
court orders changing permanency plans (but not from orders maintaining
a permanency plan),135 and permanency plan appeals can simultaneously
challenge reasonable efforts findings.136 Other states similarly permit
parties to appeal permanency plan decisions, including Alabama,137
Connecticut (where one court has noted that the extension of time in foster
care inherent in many permanency plan decisions renders such decisions
appealable),138 Louisiana,139 Massachusetts,140 Montana,141 New
Hampshire,142 Oregon,143 Oklahoma,144 Pennsylvania,145 South Carolina,146
127
128
129

State ex rel K.F., 797 N.E.2d 310, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
In re E.W., No. 101,910, 2009 WL 5063416, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2009).

J.O. v. Kentucky, Nos. 2006-CA-002100-ME, 2006-CA-002138-ME, 2007 WL 3227255 at
*1 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2007).
130
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4006 (2004) (“Orders entered under this chapter under
sections other than section 4035, 4054 or 4071 are interlocutory and are not appealable.”); In re Doris
G., 912 A.2d 572, 574 n.3 (Me. 2006) (“Both the cease reunification order and the permanency plan as
to Samantha are interlocutory orders, and are thus not appealable . . . .”).
131
In re L.E.C., 94 S.W.3d 420, 425–26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
132
133
134

In re Sarah K., 601 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Neb. 1999).
In re M.A.H., No. 14-06-00190-CV, 2006 WL 1168693, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. May 4, 2006).

The Utah Supreme Court has held that changing a permanency plan from reunification to
adoption is not appealable, In re A.F., 167 P.3d 1070, 1071 (Utah 2007), but that changing a
permanency plan to long term foster care (or “individualized permanency”) can be appealed. Cf. State
ex rel. K.F., 201 P.3d 985, 992–96 (Utah 2009). The Court distinguished the two plans because a plan
of adoption would lead to a later termination of parental rights trial while a plan of long term foster care
would not lead to any further order from which a party could appeal. Id. at 996.
135
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-303(3)(X) (LexisNexis 2006); In re James G., 943
A.2d 53, 89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
136
See, e.g., In re James G., 943 A.2d at 88–89 (determining whether the agency made
reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his son and, finding that it did not, whether the trial court’s
change in permanency plan was an abuse of discretion).
137
D.P. v. Limestone Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 28 So. 3d 759, 762–63 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
138
139
140
141

In re Todd G., 713 A.2d 1286, 1287–88 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 710(D) (2004).
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 29B (West 2008).

In re L.M., No. 03-288, 2003 WL 22838953, at *1 (Mont. Nov. 25, 2003) (considering
permanency plan appeal without discussing appealability).
142
In re Juvenile 2005-426, 910 A.2d 1240, 1241 (N.H. 2006) (considering an appeal of a
permanency hearing decision without discussing appealability).
143
OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.476(7) (2009); In re A.V., 182 P.3d 866, 870–71 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
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148

Virginia, and Wyoming.
Some states permit appeals of permanency plan hearings by leave of
appellate courts rather than by right, including Iowa, 149 New York150 and
New Jersey.151 California has established narrow procedures for appealing
permanency plan decisions.152
North Carolina has issued conflicting opinions regarding the ability to
appeal permanency plan decisions, but not others.153
The remaining twenty-one states do not have clear law on the subject.
Some states have permitted appeals of orders extending state custody of a
child over a parent’s objection, but are silent regarding appeals of
permanency plan decisions.154 In other states, courts have issued nonprecedential unpublished decisions considering permanency plan appeals
144

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-5-101 (West 2009) (permitting appeal of “any order”); In re
B.T.W., 195 P.3d 896, 897 (Okla. 2008) (considering appeal of order setting plan of reunification and
issuing visitation orders to effectuate that plan).
145
See In re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 512–13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (describing change in law to
permit all permanency plan appeals, whether of a permanency plan change or denial of a requested
change).
146
Ex parte Morris, 624 S.E.2d 649, 651–52 (S.C. 2006) (considering permanency hearing
appeal).
147
Derr v. Va. Beach Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 1264-09-1, 2009 WL 4250100, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Dec. 1, 2009) (considering permanency plan appeal without discussing appealability); Williams v.
Hampton Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 1017-02-1, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 647, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 29,
2002) (same).
148
In re H.P., 93 P.3d 982, 989 (Wyo. 2004). The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
permanency plan change ended reunification efforts and that this change “certainly affects Mother’s
substantial rights” and was thus appealable. Id.
149
There is no appeal as of right in Iowa. In re. W.D. III, 562 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 1997).
But Iowa permits parties to ask appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals. In re. T.R., 705 N.W.2d
6, 11–12 (Iowa 2005). In T.R., the Iowa Supreme Court declined to use its discretion to hear the
interlocutory appeal. Id. In other cases, the Iowa Supreme Court has used its discretion to hear
interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., In re. A.K.N.P., No. 07-1294, 2007 WL 2965148, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 12, 2007); In re. D.W., No. 07-1028, 2007 WL 2492454, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 6,
2007).
150
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACTS LAW § 1112(a) (McKinney 2010) (permitting appeals of any Family
Court orders at the discretion of appellate courts). Appellate cases include various permanency plan
appeals. E.g. In re Jahyalle F., 886 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); In re Noele B., 886 N.Y.S.2d
831 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
151
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. D.H.& J.V., 942 A.2d 41, 42 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008) (granting leave to hear permanency plan appeal).
152
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b)(1) (West 1974). See generally, Joyce G. v. Super. Ct.,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 807–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (describing legislative change requiring relevant
appeals to be made through a writ system and permitting summary dismissal of such appeals).
153
In re N.G., No. COA 06-101, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2331, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
2006) (noting competing cases and choosing to follow one within its “narrow confines”).
154
See, e.g., In re B.B., 777 N.W.2d 350, 361–62 (N.D. 2010) (considering appeal of
permanency hearing order continuing child’s placement in foster care).
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3. Permanency hearing orders are often relevant for extended and
indefinite periods of time
These “procedural safeguards” in between adjudication and
permanency are of great importance because of two realities of abuse and
neglect cases. First, in tens of thousands of cases, children remain in state
custody, but permanency trials often never occur, making permanency plan
decisions serve the same purpose as permanency trials—but without the
due process protections. Second, even when permanency trials do occur,
they often do so years after permanency plan decisions have shaped the
course of a child’s life.
Permanency trials are unnecessary when the child grows up in foster
care; with no adoption or other permanent alteration of the parent’s
custodial rights at issue, there is no need for a permanency trial. But
growing up in foster care can have the same effect as such a trial—a
permanent end of the parent’s custodial rights—and therefore permanency
plan decisions can have similar effects to permanency trials, but without
the due process protections. When a court changes a child’s permanency
plan to “another planned permanent living arrangement,”156 the federal
term that means remaining in foster care until a child reaches the age of
majority, the court is ordering the foster care agency to work to help the
child live in foster care until he reaches the age of majority, when
questions of the care, custody and control of children are moot. If that plan
is achieved, the parents will have been permanently deprived of their right
to the custody of the child.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the implications of setting a
permanency plan of long-term foster care, holding that it “effectuates a
permanent change in the child’s status” and was thus appealable.157 That
court acknowledged that the child’s situation might change and that a new
permanency plan, whether reunification with the child’s mother or
adoption by another person, could occur and the permanency plan changed
at a later permanency hearing.158 But “considering the very real possibility
that the relationship between the mother and [child] may not substantially
change, this order must be considered final for matters of appealability;
otherwise, the mother may never have an opportunity to appeal this
order.”159 The Utah court, however, is an outlier, as the next subsection
155
156
157
158
159

E.g., In re C.G., No. 2008-285, 2009 WL 170062, at *1 (Vt. Jan. 14, 2009).
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006).
In re K.F., 201 P.3d 985, 996 (Utah 2009).
Id.
Id.
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discusses.
The same result occurs when a court changes a child’s permanency
plan to adoption or guardianship, but no adoption or guardianship ever
occurs. If the foster care agency fails to make reasonable efforts to, for
instance, find an adoptive family or, despite making such reasonable
efforts, fails to find an adoptive family, then there may be no permanency
trial, and thus no moment for the parents to assert their due process rights.
The same is true if no potential permanent guardian is found by the
government or, even if found, the prospective guardian changes his or her
mind and decides not to seek guardianship chooses to not file for
guardianship.
A significant number of foster children nationally fall into these two
situations and thus effectively have permanent custody decisions made via
permanency hearings, not permanency trials. According to federal data, 14
percent of all foster children—more than 67,000 children and youth—have
a permanency plan of “emancipation” or “long-term foster care.”160 Many
more children have a permanency plan of adoption, but a plan of adoption
is no guarantee that the child will be adopted any time soon. In 2008, the
most recent year for which data is available, more than 111,000 children
had a plan of adoption, but only about 54,000 children were, in fact,
adopted.161 The remainder waited in foster care, often for multiple years.
The proportion of children in this category is even greater in some
jurisdictions. In the District of Columbia, for example, more than onethird of all foster children have plans of “alternative planned, permanent
living arrangement”—that is, long term foster care.162 More than 20
percent of all District children who left foster care left via
“emancipation.”163
Even when a permanency trial does occur, it is often years into a case.
Permanency trials end a case; if a court grants an adoption or permanent
guardianship, the child ceases to be a foster child, and his abuse or neglect
case closes. As described above, permanency hearings occur no later than
twelve months after the state first removes a child from his home.164 But
160

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2008
ESTIMATES
(2009), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report16.pdf
[hereinafter AFCARS 2008].
161
Id. It is not clear how many children with an adoption plan are the children of parents whose
rights have been terminated.
162
D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION & SAFE
FAMILIES AMENDMENT ACT OF 2000 IN THE D.C., 26 (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING THE
ADOPTION & SAFE FAMILIES AMENDMENT ACT], available at http://cfsa.dc.gov/DC/CFSA/
About+CFSA/Who+We+Are/Publications/Annual+Reports/Annual+Report+2008.
163
Id. at 32.
164

42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c)(i), n.20.
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permanency trials often occur years later. Federal data regarding when
children exit care shows that more than one-fifth of all children who leave
foster care—about 62,000 children—have remained in foster care for thirty
months or more.165 These children have remained in foster care for more
than a year—and for tens of thousands, multiple years—before the
permanency trial occurs. These data points also involve significant state
by state variation. In the District of Columbia, nearly half of all children
with a permanency plan of adoption or guardianship have been in foster
care for two years or more.166
II. THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT FOR MORE MEANINGFUL PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS

In certain situations, children and parents’ constitutional due process
rights demand some minimally sufficient procedural safeguards at
permanency hearings—at the very least, that decisions be based on
evidence, parties have the ability to present evidence and call witnesses,
and witnesses be subject to cross-examination. (In addition to these trial
court rights, the right to appeal adverse decisions will be discussed in Part
III167). This Part will follow the familiar three-factor analysis of Matthews
v. Eldridge, considering the importance of the private interest at stake, the
risk of erroneous decisions under the procedures currently used and the
probable benefit of alternative procedures, and the governmental interest,
to discuss under what circumstances permanency hearings should trigger
these procedural protections on a constitutional basis.168
This section will only address a constitutional due process argument;
many of the same points made in this section support policy arguments for
providing these procedural protections, and further policy arguments are
made in Part III.
A. Private interest
The importance of the constitutional right to family integrity is wellsettled. In 2000, when it most recently addressed the constitutional rights
of parents in detail, the Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he liberty interest at
issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
165
166

AFCARS 2008, supra note 160.

IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION & SAFE FAMILIES AMENDMENT ACT, supra note 162, at 29.
Three hundred and eighty-nine children with plans of adoption or guardianship have been in foster care
for three years or more. Id. Seven hundred and sixty-three children had plans of adoption or
guardianship. Id. at 26.
167
As discussed in Part III, the due process argument for a right to appeal is substantially weaker
than the right to evidentiary hearings. See infra Part III.
168
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 320–22 (1976).

2010]

FILLING THE DUE PROCESS DONUT HOLE

35

of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”169 For nearly a century, parental rights have
formed core elements of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence and have been repeatedly reaffirmed,170 being described as a
matter of “intrinsic human rights.”171 Reviewing these cases, the Court
concluded, “[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.”172 Although they are less well
established than parents’ rights to the custody of their children, some
courts have recognized a reciprocal right of children to live with their
parents.173
Permanency hearing decisions, independent of later permanency trials,
have tremendous impact on children and families and implicate the core
rights that inhere in the parent-child relationship. They, first, can terminate
or extend a child’s separation from his or her parent. A permanency
hearing includes a determination of the “continuing necessity” of foster
care, and, if it is not necessary, the hearing can include an order that the
child should return home.174 Indeed, it has been a core rule of child abuse
and neglect law for more than a century that when parents remedy
conditions of neglect, the state should return their children. The New York
Court of Appeals described this rule in 1899 thusly:
Intemperate parents are deemed to be unfit custodians
of their children, and the state steps in and cares for and
169
170

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (finding a fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care custody, and management of their child under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which affords them due process rights in termination hearings); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (respecting a parent’s right to their child’s religious upbringing); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing the right of parents to decide
where their children will be educated); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (protecting parents
rights to have their children taught a foreign language). Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
(noting that a parent’s decision to have a child institutionalized is not absolute and is subject to
independent medical judgment); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (noting that parental
rights are not absolute).
171
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
172
173

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.

E.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Parents and children have a
well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference”) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court has also alluded to children’s interests in their relationship with parents,
writing “until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in
preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
174
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2323(b)(2) & (f) (LexisNexis 2001).
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supports them for the time being. It now appears that the
parents have reformed, are living honorable lives, and are
abundantly able to care for their children. It seems selfevident that public policy and every consideration of
humanity demand the restoration of these children to
parental control.175
Permanency hearings determine whether a parent has reformed
sufficiently to be entitled to custody of his or her children or whether the
parent will be deprived of their child’s custody for a further period of time.
The latter option is itself a significant deprivation of liberty, especially
from the perspective of children, who are both the subjects of state custody
and whose sense of time demands prompt action.176
Second, permanency hearings establish what services, if any, will be
provided to facilitate reunification between parents and children. When a
permanency plan is changed, the state agency no longer has any obligation
to make “reasonable efforts” to achieve the old permanency plan.177
Whatever services had been offered to help a parent address the problems
led to his or her child’s removal will likely no longer be offered—indeed,
the parent and child will no longer have any entitlement to such services.
The child will now be entitled to a different set of services: those deemed
to be “reasonable efforts” to achieve the new permanency goal.
Third (and related to second point), permanency hearing decisions set
in motion a process of working towards the chosen permanency plan,
which can take years, if not the remainder of a foster child’s childhood.
The length of time that will follow, which is indefinite at the time a
permanency plan is decided, adds significant weight to these decisions,
especially considering children’s sense of time.178
At the point a permanency plan is decided, nobody can be sure when
or even if a later trial will occur. On one hand, the permanency plan is
supposed to be “final,”179 but, on the other, it may be revised at any
subsequent permanency hearing based on new facts. The Utah Supreme
Court wrestled with this issue in In re K.F., in which it held that a parent
could appeal a decision setting a permanency plan of long-term foster care
(contrary to that court’s general rule that permanency plan changes were

175
176

In re Knowack, 53 N.E. 676, 678 (N.Y. 1899).

See Pitchal, supra note 18, at 676–77 (describing a child’s interest in avoiding state custody
throughout abuse and neglect cases and that children “experience time much more slowly than adults”).
177
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)–(C) (2006).
178
179

See Pitchal, supra note 18, at 676–77.
H. R. REP. NO. 105-77, pt. 2, at 13 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745–46.
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not appealable because they require further judicial action to achieve).
The court noted that a permanency plan is “by its very nature . . . subject to
revision.”181 But the court held that the abstract ability to revise a
permanency plan was not sufficient to deny the protections of an appeal
because of “the very real possibility” that the plan would never be
changed, and no opportunity would exist to challenge it before the child
was an adult.182
The Utah Supreme Court addressed one of the easier situations
demanding greater procedural safeguards at permanency hearings.
Following a permanency plan of long-term foster care means that a child
will remain in foster care, and no permanency trial will ever occur—no
such trial will be necessary to achieve the plan of keeping the child in
foster care until he reaches the age of majority. In such cases, switching
the plan from reunification to long-term foster care has the same effect as a
trial determination—it means reunification will never occur and a parent
will be permanently deprived of the custody of his or her child—and
represents an end-run around a trial’s due process protections.
In less clear-cut cases, it is more difficult to distinguish between those
permanency plan rulings likely to permanently deny custody and those
likely to lead to a permanency trial in the near future. The indeterminate
length of permanency plan decisions is itself a strong argument for
stronger due process protections for permanency plan decisions. The
interest at stake—a permanent decision regarding family integrity—is so
precious that some trial-type procedures are required. When it is unclear at
a permanency hearing if a permanency trial will ever occur, the only way
to ensure that trial-type protections are provided is to do so at the
permanency hearing.
Still, factors do exist that courts can use to predict when permanency
trials would follow a permanency plan decision. As State ex rel K.F.
indicates, a plan change to long-term foster care is least likely to lead to a
permanency trial because the state agency is not charged with recruiting an
adoptive parent or otherwise working towards a legal status that would
require a permanency trial.183 On the other end of the spectrum, changing
a child’s plan to adoption when the government has already filed a
termination of parental rights case and the child’s foster parent has
180

State ex rel. K.F., 201 P.3d at 995–96. I use the phrase “long-term foster care” as the most
precise description of a permanency plan that calls for a child to remain in foster care until he or she
reaches the age of majority. Federal law uses an alternative phrase, “another planned permanent living
arrangement.” 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006).
181
State ex rel. K.F., 201 P.3d at 996.
182
183

Id.
Id. at 993.
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indicated a desire to adopt is likely to lead to such a trial in the near future.
Situations in between—such as setting a plan of adoption with no adoptive
parent on the horizon or setting a plan of guardianship, present harder
decisions.
In these in-between situations, the long time that can pass after setting
a permanency plan is an essential element in establishing the importance of
evidentiary standards at permanency hearings. Delaying a due process
moment itself raises constitutional concerns; the Supreme Court described
an eighteen-month delay in the disposition of $8,850 to be “quite
significant,”184 so surely waiting years for disposition of the far more
weighty right to family integrity is also significant.
Even more important, though, is the effect such a passage of time has
on any later permanency trial. The Supreme Court has explained that the
state’s “power to shape the historical events that form the basis for
termination” (or, by extension, any other form of permanency besides
reunification) increases the risk of error at the ultimate termination
proceeding.185 The time that passes between a permanency plan change
away from reunification and any later permanency trial heightens this state
power and increases the likelihood that a termination of parental rights,
adoption, or guardianship motion will both be filed and granted, thereby
permanently eliminating parents’ right to care, custody and control of their
children. This phenomenon occurs in multiple ways.
By the time an adoption or guardianship trial occurs, the child has been
living in foster care—often with the family seeking adoption or
guardianship—for years, and courts will likely consider how well the child
is doing while in foster care and whatever bonds may have formed between
the child and his foster family.186
Similarly, the court will consider the state of the child’s relationship
with his parent,187 a relationship that will surely have been affected by
months or years of forced separation, limited only by state-regulated
visitation. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, abuse and
neglect cases are unique proceedings that do not “involve only facts gone
by.”188 Foster children’s “lives are an ongoing event,” and adoption and
guardianship cases involve “a fresh assessment of the present situation,”
not a review limited to facts that occurred in the past.189 The child’s
184

United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S.
555, 565 (1983).
185
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.745, 762–63 (1982).
186
187
188
189

See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2353(b)(1), (3) (LexisNexis 2001).
Id.
In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413, 420 (D.C. 2009).
Id. (emphasis added) (describing considerations for new adoption proceeding on remand).
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relationship with his parent is particularly likely to have changed because
of the immediate legal effects of a permanency plan change. Continuing
the child’s separation from parents will further reduce the bonds between
children and parents. Removing the legal requirement that the state agency
make “reasonable efforts” to achieve reunification means that the state will
no longer provide those services from which a parent may have benefited,
such as assistance obtaining substance abuse treatment, mental health
treatment, or anything else that would improve his relationship with his
child.190 The absence of such services will, in many cases, take its toll on
the parent’s relationship with his child.
Moreover, the decision to change a permanency plan reflects a judge’s
factual determination about whether reunification is likely, and if not, why
not. This determination can establish the factual basis for a later
permanency hearing. As a California court observed, “[t]he critical
decision regarding parental rights will be made at the dispositional or
review hearing, that is, that the minor cannot be returned home and that
reunification efforts should not be pursued.”191 A New Mexico court put it
more modestly: “permanency hearings determine the direction of the
proceedings and can increase the risk that the natural family will be
destroyed.”192 Indeed, it is the precise intent of Congress that permanency
plan decisions have the effect that these California and New Mexico courts
identified: that they be “final permanency decisions” for a child.193
The practical finality of a permanency plan decision is heightened by
the expanding use of unified family courts following a “one family, one
judge” model.194 In such courts, the same judge who makes a permanency
plan decision will hear any later cases regarding the termination of parental
rights, adoptions, or guardianships.195 In these later cases, therefore, a
judge is asked to issue an order to effectuate the permanency plan that she
or he set. Judges, like any human being, may be expected to consider their
own prior decisions when making later, more permanent decisions on the
190

42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (2006); see supra text
accompanying note 19.
191
Glen C. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted).
See also N.M. ex rel Children, Youth & Family Dep’t v. Maria C., 94 P.3d 796, 806 (N.M. Ct. App.
2004) (“Hence, the factual basis for termination is largely established at the permanency hearing, even
though a formal TPR hearing follows.”).
192
N.M. ex rel Children, Youth & Family Dep’t v. Maria C., 94 P.3d at 806.
193
194

H. R. REP. NO. 105-77, pt. 2, at 1, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745–46.

James W. Bozzomo & Gregory Scolieri, A Survey of Unified Family Courts: An Assessment
of Different Jurisdictional Models, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 12, 16 (2004). The ABA has recommended use
of unified family courts and many states have adopted them. Id. at 12.; Developments in the Law—The
Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2099–100 (2003).
195
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 11-1104(b)(2)(B) (LexisNexis 2001).
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same subject matter.
The strong role of permanency plan decisions in shaping future events,
including permanency trial results, is of crucial importance in light of the
rule that the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to be heard “at a
meaningful time.”196 When a permanency hearing shapes the facts that will
determine a later trial, the meaningful time for due process protections is at
the permanency hearing.
Finally, the time that passes from a permanency plan decision to a
permanency trial is significant because making important decisions on a
child’s sense of time is of particular importance in abuse and neglect cases.
Waiting one or two years for a trial and resolution may not seem long in
the world of, for instance, commercial litigation. But it is an eternity in the
lives of children, especially young children, who are disproportionately
represented in foster care.197 A seminal work informing abuse and neglect
practice emphasized that courts and agencies should handle decisions
regarding a child’s placement “as a matter of urgency that comports with
the child’s sense of time.”198 Quick decisions are particularly important
because children subject to permanency hearings have already spent up to
fourteen months in foster care, waiting another year or more to get it right
raises significant concerns.
1. The importance of the rights at stake varies depending on the status
of the case.
Not all permanency plan decisions have equal constitutional
implications. The core constitutional right at stake in abuse and neglect
cases is the parent’s right to “care, custody, and control” of their child,199
and the child’s reciprocal right to a relationship with his parent.200
Changing a child’s permanency plan from reunification with a parent to
anything else directly implicates this constitutional right; it means the state
agency will no longer work towards protecting the parent-child
relationship and will instead work towards a permanency plan that will
permanently disrupt that relationship.
Other permanency plan changes do not affect this relationship.
Switching a child’s plan from, for instance, guardianship with an extended
196

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (emphasis added) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
197
The mean age of foster children is under 10 and 35 percent of all foster children are zero to
five years old. AFCARS 2008, supra note 160.
198
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL
ALTERNATIVE 43 (1996).
199
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
200

Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S.745, 760 (1982) (noting a child’s interest in avoiding “erroneous
termination of their natural relationship” (citation omitted)).
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family member to adoption by a foster parent has less impact on the
parent-child relationship. Adoption will terminate parental rights while
guardianship will not. That is no small difference; but, through either
guardianship or adoption, the parent permanently loses the right to care,
custody, and control of the child. Still, in some cases, constitutionallyprotected relationships may be at stake. The Supreme Court has applied
parental rights doctrines to non-parent caregivers201 and, in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, recognized that
the “intimacy of daily association” may lead to a constitutionally-protected
relationship.202 If a permanency plan change affects such a relationship,
then constitutional rights are affected—even if those rights are less
powerful than the right to a parent-child relationship. In Smith, the Court
wrote that a foster family—at least one that had raised a young child for
several years—could not be “dismiss[ed] . . . as a mere collection of
unrelated individuals.”203 The Smith Court assumed, but did not decide,
that some liberty interest existed in the integrity of a foster family.204
Smith was particularly concerned with the possibility that recognizing
the due process rights of foster parents would inevitably “derogat[e] from
the substantive liberty” interest of parents, especially when, as in Smith,205
foster parents objected to a child’s reunification with her parent.206 But
Smith also noted that when the question was between alternative foster
placements and not between foster parent and natural parent, then this
conflict is absent.207 In these situations, the statutory scheme on review in
Smith provided foster families with access to a “full adversary
administrative hearing” to challenge any removals,208 and Smith stated that
such procedures adequately respected any rights that foster families
have.209
A permanency plan decision that pits, for instance, adoption by one
long-term foster parent against adoption by a different foster parent, does
not raise the problem of setting parents against foster parents. Such
decisions may raise due process concerns. If long-term foster parents were
201

The “parent” in Prince v. Massachusetts was the aunt of a nine-year-old girl. 321 U.S. 158,
159 (1944).
202
See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
203
204
205
206
207

Id. at 844–45.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847. See also id. at 853.

Id. at 851 (“When the child’s transfer from one foster home to another is pending, the interest
arguably requiring protection is that of the foster family, not that of the natural parents.”).
208
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 830 (1977).
209

Id. at 847–56.
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statutorily entitled to a full adversary hearing to challenge removals of
children, it stands to reason that they should also be entitled to more
meaningful procedural safeguards regarding permanency plans that will
likely lead to such removals. Smith did not squarely answer the question
whether such situations rose to constitutional due process issues, but it
bears noting that constitutionally-protected relationships other than parentchild relationships may be at play.
Even when a permanency plan affects no constitutionally-protected
relationship, it can have a significant effect on a child. A plan change
affects where the child will live, whether and how long the child remains in
foster care, and what “reasonable efforts” the state agency will take. These
effects may not rise to constitutional status, and in those cases, only a weak
due process argument exists. But the absence of a constitutional claim
should not unduly diminish the effect of such changes on children’s lives.
State policymakers should be significantly concerned with establishing a
system that will make these decisions as effectively as possible. Without
evidentiary hearings and appeals, permanency hearings will have high
error rates and will significantly impact the lives of foster children.
Ordering state agencies to make reasonable efforts to achieve a
permanency plan that is either unachievable or harmful to a child will
require state agencies to expend significant resources contrary to the state’s
or the child’s interests.
B. Risk of error
It hardly requires much explanation to argue that evidentiary hearings
are essential to reaching accurate decisions. The Supreme Court has
written that “our legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best
means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error.”210 John
Henry Wigmore wrote that cross-examination of sworn witnesses is “the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”211 When
facts are contested, holding an evidentiary hearing is the best means of
determining which party’s version is the most accurate. Denying such
evidentiary hearings is to create an unjustifiable risk of error. As one New
York City family court judge stated: “There is such a discrepancy between
210

Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). Mackey involved an administrative suspension
of a driver’s license without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court stated the general
rule, quoted in the text, before noting the exception for some administrative deprivations, especially
those that do not have a high risk of error. Id. at 13–17. The Mackey exception does not diminish the
strength of the general rule as applied to fundamental rights of family integrity in the midst of an
adversarial court process.
211
5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367, at 32 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1974).
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the Permanency Report and the case record sometimes and it’s too late
when you get [to] the TPR to find out… what’s going on.”212
In Kent v. United States,213 the Supreme Court addressed interlocutory
decisions issued in another context, but, like permanency hearing orders,
they were based on reports submitted to judges214 rather than formal
evidence. The Court also held that these reports should be subject “to
examination, criticism and refutation” by counsel for parties who disagree
with the facts or conclusions asserted in such report.215 Kent involved
judges handling juveniles accused of committing criminal acts. Like
judges in child abuse and neglect cases, judges in juvenile criminal cases
act pursuant to the State’s parens patriae authority, but, as the Kent Court
stated, “the admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an
invitation to procedural arbitrariness.”216
Like federal and state
permanency hearing statutes, the statute at issue in Kent required juvenile
court judges to make a critical decision, but it gave no guidance as to how
judges were to do so or what evidence or other information they must
consider. The statute required juvenile court judges to determine whether
to transfer a teenager to adult criminal court for prosecution as an adult
following a “full investigation,” but did “not state standards to govern the
Juvenile Court’s decision.”217 The lower court had held that crossexamination of material in such reports would be too adversarial,218 but the
Supreme Court held that some adversarial proceedings (presumably
involving the cross-examination of authors of such reports) were essential
for “critically important” decisions.219 If, as I have argued in Part II.A,
permanency hearing decisions are critically important, then Kent strongly
suggests that adversarial proceedings, including cross-examination and the
ability to produce and contest evidence, should exist at such hearings.
When the high risk of error in permanency hearings does lead to actual
errors, the result is unnecessarily difficult custody decisions at later points.
When a court incorrectly decides not to pursue reunification with a parent,
212
213
214

CHILDREN’S RTS., supra note 58, at 195.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

Kent involved discretionary juvenile court decisions to waive minors accused of certain
crimes to criminal court to be tried as adults. The Supreme Court described waiver decision at issue in
Kent as based on “recommendations of the Juvenile Court staff, the Social Service file relating to
petitioner, and a report dated September 8, 1961 (three days following petitioner’s apprehension),
submitted to [the judge] by the Juvenile Probation Section.” Id. at 547.
215
Id. at 563.
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Id. at 555.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 560.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966).
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but denies a later-filed adoption petition (or grants such a petition but is
later reversed), the court sets up an even more emotionally fraught custody
fight. By the time the court revisits the permanency plan, the child has
likely been living in a foster home separated from his parents for years. A
recently decided District of Columbia case illustrates this phenomenon.
Henry Obiazor220 shared custody of his sons with their mother. Their
mother stipulated that she had neglected the children, but Obiazor was
never found to be unfit.221 Over Obiazor’s objection, the permanency plan
was changed from reunification with him to adoption.222 The trial court
justified that change by pointing to Obiazor’s recent conviction of
misdemeanor sexual abuse of a girl unrelated to him.223 Obiazor had no
opportunity to appeal this permanency plan decision. Under District law,
permanency plan decisions do not require evidentiary hearings and are not
appealable orders.224
This permanency plan decision was suspect for multiple reasons. First,
Obiazor was never found to be unfit.225 Second, the neglect and adoption
cases involved no independent exploration of the facts underlying
Obiazor’s criminal conviction, and that conviction was later reversed.226
Third, even if Obiazor was in fact guilty (as unsettling as child molestation
is), it would not necessarily establish that he was unfit to parent his sons.
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted, abuse of one child in the home
is not conclusive that another child in the home was or would be abused.227
That is particularly true in this case—even if Obiazor was guilty of
molesting an unrelated girl, such guilt does not prove that he posed a
danger to his biological sons.228 Even if the court accepted the laterreversed conviction, more evidence would be necessary to determine that
Obiazor was an unfit parent and that reunification with him would not be
appropriate.
The resulting gap in time is illustrative of the problem. Obiazor’s sons
entered foster care in November 2004, and the permanency plan change to
adoption followed in September 2005. The parties then waited nineteen
220

Facts from this case may be found in In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 (D.C. 2009). Although the
parties are referred to only by their initials in the opinion, a related criminal case refers to Mr. Obiazor
by name. Obiazor v. United States, 964 A.2d 147 (D.C. 2009) (citing In re S.M., 985 A.2d at 416).
221
See In re S.M., 985 A.2d at 415.
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Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.
In re S.M., 985 A.2d at 415.
Obiazor v. United States, 964 A.2d 147, 154 (D.C. 2009).
In re S.M., 985 A.2d at 418–19 n.9.
Id.
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months, until May 2007, to begin an adoption trial. A final judgment
granting the adoption and terminating Obiazor’s parental rights followed
fourteen months later, in July 2008.229 Obiazor appealed, and sixteen
months after the final decree of adoption, the adoption was overturned in
December 2009—more than four years after the court made the mistaken
permanency plan decision.230
The court of appeals noted the flawed permanency plan at oral
argument and indicated that the 2005 permanency plan decision—not the
2008 adoption decision—is where the trial court went off track. Chief
Judge Eric Washington put it this way:
There are cases that have come before us where the
fact of the goal change in essence makes a fait accompli of
the termination of parental rights and adoption…. Is this
virtually unreviewable for us because ultimately when they
go back down how are they going to take a kid who has
been with somebody six years away from them? It’s the
same point there because courts are eliminating visitation,
you know, they are taking all the resources away from
assisting in the reunification, which is what adoption goal
change means, to eliminate this or create a situation in
which you can’t defend against a termination . . . .231
But once those three years had passed, the court felt limited in what it
could do. Obiazor’s sons had lived with their would-be adoptive parents
since December 2006,232 three years before the decision reversing the
adoption. Recognizing that the “ongoing event[s]” of the children’s
lives—including, most obviously, whatever bonding may have occurred
with the would-be adoptive parents and whatever harm to the relationship
between them and their father that occurred in the interim—should be
taken into account on remand.233 So, more than five years after his sons
initially entered foster care, Obiazor was nominally victorious on appeal,
but all he truly won was a remand for more litigation to consider his sons’
fate, during which they would spend yet more time separated from him.
Had the permanency hearing gotten it right the first time, Obiazor would
have had a much more meaningful victory: the right to immediately regain
229
230
231

Id. at 415–16.
Id.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 11:36:34, In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 (No. 08-FS-1093) (on file
with author).
232
In re S.M., 985 A.2d at 415.
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Id. at 418, 420.
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custody of his sons.
The lack of sufficient procedural safeguards at the permanency hearing
in 2005, therefore, set up an unnecessarily difficult and emotionally fraught
decision upon remand after the 2009 appellate decision: return the children
to their fit (or, at least, not proven unfit234) father or leave them with the
individuals who have acted as their parents for three years—the longest
span in these boys’ lives that they have had steady parental figures. No
matter how this case is resolved, the boys will be unnecessarily harmed by
the protracted litigation and the likely (if not inevitable) separation from
either their father or their caretakers of the previous three years. I do not
suggest that the Obiazor children’s foster parents and their father stand on
equal footing; they do not.235 Rather, I suggest only that by delaying the
due process moment for four years imposes unnecessary emotional trauma
on everyone involved—the children, their father, and their foster parents—
that the legal system ought to avoid. The due process relief—overturning
the adoption and traumatizing the children by separating them from their
caretakers of many years or their fit father—is, in the words of Chief Judge
Washington at oral argument, “almost a sham.”236
C. State interest
The state interest also weighs in favor of greater protections at
permanency hearings. The State is not well served by creating dilemmas
like the remand in Obiazor’s case. Indeed, the State’s interest in speedier
resolution of cases, and the avoidance of cases such as Obiazor’s, is served
by greater procedural safeguards at permanency hearings.
Greater procedural protections at permanency hearing stages would
impose additional litigation burdens on the state agencies. But these
burdens should not be great when considered in light of the broader set of
child abuse and neglect laws. If a state agency seeks to change a child’s
permanency plan from reunification to adoption, the agency should have,
under federal law, made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his
parent or parents, developed a case plan to achieve reunification, and, if the
234

The government indicated it would attempt to retry Obiazor on molestation charges after his
conviction was reversed on appeal, and had alleged that he neglected his sons by leaving them with
their mother and grandmother who he knew to be drug addicts, even though this allegation was not the
basis of a neglect adjudication or the later adoption. Id. at 415–16 & n. 3.
235
The D.C. Court of Appeals, consistent with the Supreme Court, made clear that the children’s
father is entitled to a constitutional presumption that custody with him will serve their best interests.
Id. at 417. (discussing parental presumption). See also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47 (1977) (describing rights of foster families as secondary to rights of
natural families).
236
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11:27, In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 (No. 08-FS-1093) (on file
with author).
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state urges a permanency plan other than reunification, documented why
its efforts failed and why a new plan is appropriate. Having done all of
that work as required by the federal statutory and regulatory scheme
summarized above237 (which the state should have done regardless of the
procedures required at permanency hearings), the additional burden of
proving that the state agency has done that work and defending its
professional judgment is relatively slight. When the state has failed to do
that work or has not exercised sound or lawful judgment regarding a
child’s permanency plan, the State has no legitimate interest in avoiding
accountability in court.
Greater procedural protections at permanency hearings would also
impose greater burdens on state courts, which would have to hold these
evidentiary hearings. But by improving the quality of decision-making,
such protections should lead to more children reaching legal permanency
faster, thus reducing the burden on state courts imposed by long-open
abuse and neglect cases. If the District of Columbia family court had
gotten the permanency hearing in Obiazor correct the first time and
reunified Mr. Obiazor with his children, it could have closed the case fairly
quickly and avoided the need for several years’ worth of permanency
hearings and at least one permanency trial. Such added efficiencies
balance out those cases in which courts would reach the same result with
evidentiary hearings as they would without. To the extent one believes
that the latter category of cases outweighs the former and thus creates
significant judicial efficiency concerns, the Supreme Court’s response to
such concerns in the core parental rights case Stanley v. Illinois is apropos:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials.238
III. SOLUTION
The due process donut hole should be filled through two basic steps:
providing evidentiary hearings regarding permanency plans and reasonable
efforts findings when the factual basis to those findings is contested, and a
right to appeal adverse rulings. The arguments made in Part II also
237
238

See supra Part I.B.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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establish policy grounds for taking these two steps, and further policy
arguments are developed below.
A. Evidentiary hearings when permanency plan is contested
Permanency plan decisions often rest on various mixed questions of
fact and law: what steps are necessary for a parent to regain custody of his
or her children? Has a parent fully or substantially complied with those
steps? If not, is the harm to the child of continued separation from his or
her parent greater or less than the harm of returning to an incompletely
remedied home? Has the state agency provided adequate assistance to help
the parent comply with necessary steps?
When a judge must make important decisions as the facts underlying
those decisions are contested, it is elementary that evidentiary hearings
should occur. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful way at a meaningful time.239 If, as I have argued,
permanency hearings involve important decisions, and if questions like
those listed in the preceding paragraph are contested, then it seems
indisputable that being heard in a meaningful manner must “include[] an
opportunity to review and present evidence, confront and cross examine
witnesses, and consult with counsel”240—in other words, to have a
contested evidentiary hearing.
Such evidentiary hearings should be required by law whenever the
parties disagree over what permanency plan the court should adopt for a
child. When such disagreements exist, the evidentiary hearing should also
address whether the State has made reasonable efforts to achieve the
permanency plan that has been in place. To make these evidentiary
hearings as meaningful as possible, states should provide indigent parents
with counsel.241
The availability of evidentiary hearings will have an additional positive
effect of strengthening the negotiating position of parents and children
regarding permanency hearing decisions. Professor Erik Pitchal has
relayed the story of two of his former child clients who had been in foster
care and who could not reunify with their mother because she had not
remedied the conditions that led to the boys’ removal.242 The boys wanted
to live with an aunt, but their social worker thought that their aunt would

239
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
N.M. ex rel. Children, Youth & Family Dep’t v. Maria C., 94 P.3d 796, 805 (N.M. Ct. App.

2004).
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not take care of them well. The boys disagreed; their aunt had lived with
them in the past, “achieved some stability in her own young life,” and was
planning to move to South Carolina where other extended family members
could support her.244 The judge treated permanency hearings as “ten
minute pro forma” events at which he “generally endorsed whatever
caseworkers presented.”245 Without a chance to challenge the social
worker’s conclusions about the boys’ aunt through an evidentiary hearing,
or at least threaten to do so, the children’s lawyers had little opportunity to
make their case to leave foster care and live with their aunt.
Fortunately, the children’s lawyer could use evidentiary tools to
achieve a better result for them because New York law provides that
parties may introduce material and relevant evidence at permanency
hearings.246 Following discovery requests and written interrogatories, the
foster care agency settled, and the boys eventually lived with their aunt.247
The risk of error for these children was reduced because their attorney
could use these classic due process tools. If those tools had been
foreclosed, the agency could have ignored the lawyer’s request, and the
boys would likely have remained in foster care.
This conclusion applies, of course, regardless of the competing plans at
issue, or whether parents or children use the tools described. If the boys
wanted to reunify and they or their mother could prove that their mother
was fit and able to take care of them, the same lawyerly tactics should have
been available and could have led to analogous results.
B. Appealing adverse rulings
Policymakers should also permit aggrieved parties to appeal adverse
permanency plan and related reasonable efforts decisions.
Constitutional doctrine does not provide the primary reason for this
recommendation because the Supreme Court has held that “the Federal
Constitution guarantees no right to appellate review.”248
Some
constitutional concerns are evident; although the Court has not recognized
a due process right to appeal, it has addressed equal protection challenges
to state actions that limit an individual’s right to appeal when the State
grants it in similar situations. That is, “once a State affords” the right to
243
244
245
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appeal, “the State may not ‘bolt the door to equal justice.”
Although
some creative arguments may exist to establish a right to appeal, that is
beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather than constitutional doctrine, my argument rests on policy
concerns that should animate state action to provide for appeals of
permanency plan decisions. The same argument regarding evidentiary
hearings applies; the risk of trial court error is high and the State (as
Obiazor demonstrates) should have an interest in getting permanency plan
decisions correct. Appellate courts’ error-correction function helps ensure
trial court accuracy and thus address these concerns. In addition, by
resolving whether the State made reasonable efforts to reunify children
with parents early in a case, the State can ensure that a later termination of
parental rights (hereinafter “TPR”) or adoption or guardianship will not fail
due to a finding that the State failed to make such efforts.250
In addition, the law-creating function of appellate courts should
encourage state policymakers to permit appeals of permanency plan
decisions. These decisions currently suffer from a lack of clear legal
guidance. The most common standard to be applied is the best interests of
the child—that is, no standard at all.251 Federal law requires permanency
hearings to exist, but it does not prescribe the standards to be applied to
plan changes. Similarly, federal law requires state courts to determine if a
state agency has made “reasonable efforts” to reunify the child or achieve
whatever other permanency plan has been set, but it does not define the
term.252
It is this absence of clear legal guidance that led to mistakes like those
in Henry Obiazor’s case, discussed above. The absence of any finding of
249

Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). See also
id. at 120 (noting that most decisions regarding the right to appeal are subject to an equal protection
analysis).
250
As a recent Alabama decision held, State courts would rule that such challenges should be
raised at the appropriate time at permanency hearings and not at permanency trials. “[A]ny error the
juvenile court may have committed in this case by relieving DHR of the duty to use reasonable efforts
should have been appealed at that point and cannot now be raised following the judgment terminating
the mother’s parental rights.” M.H. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., No. 2081070, 2010 WL
565281, at *2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). Such rulings respond to the concern that waiting until
permanency trials to hear appeals of reasonable efforts findings amounts to “punish[ing] the child for
the agency’s failure.” David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child
Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 194 n.161 (1992).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, has described the best interest of the child
standard as providing a “judicial opportunity to engage in social engineering.” Watkins v. Nelson, 748
A.2d 558, 567 (N.J. 2000). See also MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS 40 (2005) (The best interest of the child standard “invites the judge to rely on his or her own
values and biases to decide the case.”).
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unfitness against Mr. Obiazor should have affected the permanency plan
decision; any other result would violate the core doctrine that a parent is
presumed fit and custody with the parent is presumed in the child’s best
interests. When Obiazor appealed the ultimate adoption ruling, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in his favor, vindicating the long-standing
legal rights of fit parents. But because the permanency plan could not be
appealed, no new law regarding the permanency plan decision was created;
thus, no new guidance is offered to trial judges the next time a case like
Obiazor’s occurs, let alone a more difficult case in which a parent’s past
unfitness is established but present unfitness is unclear and contested.
More difficult questions will also arise in permanency plan cases, such
as:
When a parent has partly remedied conditions that
supported a finding of neglect, should the child reunify, or
should the plan be changed away from reunification due to
the parent’s incomplete actions?
When a parent has remedied conditions that
supported a finding of neglect, but the State claims that
some other facts justify continued or permanent separation
of the child from a parent, under what circumstances is
continued separation legally justified?
In close cases, how should courts weigh a child’s
opinion about his or her permanency plan? How does the
answer to this question vary with a child’s age?253
How should a state agency’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to achieve reunification in the past
inform a decision about a permanency plan in the future?
What hearsay testimony, if any, should be
admitted at permanency hearings?
My purpose is not to answer these questions, and doing so is beyond
the scope of this Article. Rather, I offer a short list of questions of law and
fact that arise at permanency hearings and for which appellate guidance
would be useful. Without appeals of permanency plan and related
reasonable efforts findings, however, only a void exists.
State law must fill the void, but, with most states merely echoing
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Federal law requires consultation “in an age-appropriate manner” with children regarding
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vague federal law in their own statutes, trial courts are left with nearly
unfettered discretion. Permitting appeals of permanency plan and
reasonable efforts decisions will force appellate courts to develop
decisional law, providing more useful guidance to trial courts. Uniformity
of decisions would be enhanced, and difficult substantive questions of law
could receive some answers.
The concern expressed by some state courts is that appeals will take
too long.255 These concerns can be addressed through specific appellate
mechanisms: states can provide for expedited appellate procedures,
including specific deadlines for briefs and decisions. The National Council
of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has proposed a 150-day timeline for
adjudicating TPR appeals,256 and shorter timelines should be possible for
permanency hearing appeals. States can also provide rules for when, if
ever, a permanency plan decision should be stayed pending appellate
review or when consideration of an appeal should be stayed pending other
prompt trial court developments. Just as the due process right to an
evidentiary permanency hearing is less when a TPR trial will occur
imminently,257 hearing an appeal of a permanency plan order is less
important when a permanency trial based on that order occurs in a short
time after the permanency hearing. States with multiple levels of appellate
review can at least provide access to intermediate appellate review.
C. Implementing these policy changes
As the law governing child abuse and neglect cases finds its sources in
federal statutory law, constitutional law, state statutory law, and state case
law, the above solutions should be implemented through all such sources.
Congress and the Children’s Bureau (the division of the Department of
Health and Human Services charged with implementing the relevant
provisions of federal law) should better define the “procedural safeguards”
at permanency hearings. Through statute, regulation, or non-regulatory
guidance, they should make clear that evidentiary hearings should be
available to any party that contests the basic facts relevant to permanency
hearing decisions, and that state court systems should provide for prompt
appeals of such decisions.
254

See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2323(c) (LexisNexis 2001) (requiring courts to determine a child’s
“permanency plan” at a permanency hearing, but not providing details regarding the procedural
protections surrounding such decisions).
255
See Rita J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 1 P.3d 155 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) and text
accompanying note 122.
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ADOPTION & PERMANENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 52, at 40.
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See supra Part II.A (distinguishing permanency plan decisions leading to indefinite stays in
foster care before a permanency trial with those likely or certain to lead to a prompt permanency trial).
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As a matter of federal constitutional law, as well as state law, courts
handling these cases should provide the basic protections outlined here:
evidentiary hearings and the right to appeal. If state courts fail to do so,
state legislatures should step in, a point particularly appropriate in those
states whose courts have explicitly ruled that evidentiary hearings or
appeals are not required for permanency hearings.
IV. ALTERNATIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS PROVIDE UNSATISFACTORY
SOLUTIONS

One might ask whether the due process protections at the beginning
and end of an abuse or neglect case are insufficient on either constitutional
or policy grounds. In other words, might the donut itself resolve whatever
concerns exist within the donut hole? This section will argue that neither
the initial abuse or neglect trial nor the permanency trial provides sufficient
process to satisfy the constitutional or policy concerns discussed above.
A. Initial abuse or neglect findings are insufficient protections
As discussed in Part I.A, the initial stage of an abuse or neglect case
involves trials—with all the due process protections common in most civil
trials—regarding whether a parent has neglected his or her child in the
past. These trials provide insufficient protections because their subject
matter is distinct from the subject matter that determines a permanency
plan. An abuse or neglect trial is necessarily backwards-looking; it
determines whether a parent has abused or neglected the child in the past.
It does not determine what services are necessary to remedy the parent’s
unfitness, whether the agency provided adequate services to remedy the
parent’s unfitness, whether the parent would continue to abuse or neglect
the child in the future, or whether reunification or some other permanency
plan (and if some other plan, which one) would best serve a child’s
interests.
Existing federal law establishes that an initial finding of abuse or
neglect does not, in the vast majority of cases, indicate that any of the other
issues are irrelevant. Federal law provides that, in most cases, reasonable
efforts to reunify families “shall be made . . . to make it possible for a child
to safely return to the child’s home.”258 The only exception to this
requirement is when the parent’s conduct demonstrates that “aggravated
circumstances” exist, such as the murder or voluntary manslaughter of
another child, or the serious physical abuse of the child.259 These extreme
cases are the only situations that, under federal law, indicate abuse so
258
259
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severe that reunification ought not be pursued at all. They are, therefore,
the only situation in which post-adjudication facts—such as the adequacy
of agency and parental efforts to reunify—are not relevant. The logical
corollary is that in the vast majority of cases,260 a finding that abuse or
neglect occurred in the past is not sufficient to conclude whether the child
should reunify with a parent or whether the agency should work towards
placing the child in someone else’s permanency custody. An abuse or
neglect adjudication, therefore, does not answer the questions that
permanency hearings are required to answer and thus cannot provide
sufficient due process protections at such hearings.
B. Permanency trials—and, especially, termination of parental rights
trials—are insufficient protections
The stronger counterargument to more due process protections for
these interim periods is that TPRs or other permanency trials (such as
guardianship trials) will provide parents and children with the necessary
procedural protections. These permanency trials address some of the same
issues that inform permanency plan decisions, such as a parent’s
remediation (or lack thereof) of the conditions leading to the child’s
neglect. But, as discussed above, it is not possible to determine at a
permanency hearing when or even whether such permanency trials will
occur. The only way, therefore, for these permanency trials to fill the due
process donut hole is to require that they occur relatively quickly after a
permanency hearing. Federal law has indeed taken a step in this direction.
Since 1997, federal law has required, absent certain exceptions, states to
file termination of parental rights petitions whenever a child has been in
foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months,261 making it
more likely that TPRs will occur promptly and effectively providing due
process protections when children remain in foster care for an extended
period of time. Some state laws go further; Florida, for instance, requires
that a TPR be filed or that one will soon be filed as a condition precedent
to setting a permanency plan of adoption.262
TPR trials, however, do not empirically provide these due process
protections in many cases; existing law does not require them to do so, and
their policy purpose is ill-suited to fill the due process donut hole.
What empirical data exists suggests that many states take advantage of
260

More than two-thirds of all children removed from their families by child protection
authorities were removed for neglect, not the severe abuse that would trigger the “aggravated
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federal law provisions that excuse states’ decisions to not file or not pursue
TPRs. Federal law lists several exceptions to the requirement of filing
TPRs, including whenever the State documents “compelling reason[s]” not
to do so.263 Federal law also only requires states to “file” TPRs; in
individual cases, the government and other parties are free to ask judges to
delay holding TPR trials until an adoptive parent is identified to avoid
unnecessarily terminating rights. A 2002 General Accounting Office
survey of states found wide use of exceptions to the requirement of filing
TPRs. Among participating states, “the number of children exempted from
the provision [encouraging TPRs after fifteen of twenty-two months in
foster care] greatly exceeded the number of children to whom it was
applied.”264 In addition, national data shows 123,000 children “waiting to
be adopted,” only 75,000 of whom have been the subject of a TPR.265
About 50,000 children, therefore, have had a court set a permanency plan
of adoption but have not been the subject of a TPR. These children may
“wait” for a TPR or adoption trial for months or years, and these
permanency trials do not provide due process protections in the interim.
About 100,000 more children have permanency plans other than
reunification or adoption;266 a TPR is not necessary to achieve these
permanency plans, and these children are thus unlikely to be subject to
TPR proceedings.
The empirical reality that TPRs do not fill the due process donut hole
is as it should be. TPRs are limited and imperfect policy tools; using them
to more fully fill the donut hole would lead to bad results.
Terminating parental rights is a “drastic remedy”267 intended to
increase a foster care agency’s chances of finding adoptive parents for
those children.268 Despite this purpose, little empirical evidence exists to
263
264

42 U.S.C. § 675(E)(ii) (2006).

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-585, FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION
HELPS STATES FOCUS ON FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING
BARRIERS REMAIN 27 (2002).
265
AFCARS 2008, supra note 160.
266
267
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Id.
In re C.M., 916 A.2d 169, 175 (D.C. 2007).

Some legislatures have connected TPRs to adoptions more directly, stating, for instance, that
the “sooner a child is freed for purposes of an adoptive placement [that is, subject to a TPR], the sooner
he or she will finally obtain an environment of permanence and continuity of relationships.” COUNCIL
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON TITLE IV OF BILL NO. 248, THE PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT ACT OF 1977 at 6 (1977). Courts have put the
issue more modestly, stating that a TPR decision includes “[a]n analysis of the likelihood that the child
would be adopted if parental rights were terminated.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 360(a)(6) (West
2008); cf. In re Dependency of A.C., 98 P.3d 89, 95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (considering “the
likelihood the child would be adopted if parental rights were terminated”); Dep’t of Children & Family
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suggest that widespread TPRs actually lead to more adoptions. On the
contrary, significant evidence exists that widespread TPRs only lead to
more “legal orphans”—children deprived of a legal parent by the TPR
whom child welfare agencies do not place in a legally permanent family.
Richard Barth, the Dean of the University of Maryland School of
Social Work and a leading child welfare scholar, has studied national data
regarding the effect of TPRs on adoption and concluded:
There seems to be negligible evidentiary support for
ASFA’s implicit assumption that TPRs would allow for
improved child-specific recruitment and result in a vastly
greater, national pool of adoptive families to provide
permanency to older children. Instead, there is growing
evidence that a substantial number of children will reside
in foster care, or leave foster care to exits other than
adoption, after their legal ties to their parents have been
terminated.269
Barth has quantified this effect: in recent years, an average of 20,000
more children were subjects of termination orders than were adopted,
meaning the number of legal orphans increased by tens of thousands each
year.270 Dean Barth’s conclusion echoes the conclusions of various studies
over the past two decades. A 2003 study of federal foster care and
adoption data concluded that “termination of parental rights is not assuring
swift, legal permanency for children in foster care.”271 A 1997 study found
that the number of children whose relationship with their parents had been
legally terminated, but who remained in foster care without a permanent
family, had more than doubled across the United States.272 A detailed
multi-year study of Michigan and New York—both states that increased
the number of TPRs even before passage of the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act—reached a sobering conclusion:

v. J.W., 773 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to grant TPR because of unlikelihood
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Five years of aggressively terminating parents [sic]
rights has produced a clear pattern: The number of
children freed for adoption goes up every year; the number
of children adopted fails to keep pace with the number of
adoption-eligible children; and the total number of
orphaned children not adopted continues to increase fastest
of all.273
More frequent use of TPRs coincided with an increase in the number of
adoptions,274 but a causal link remains unclear and, as the study concluded,
those increases did not “keep pace” with the number of legally orphaned
children.275
District of Columbia statistics demonstrate a similar conclusion: a
majority—perhaps a very large majority—of children whose relationships
with their parents are terminated without an adoptive parent already
identified become legal orphans. The District of Columbia family court
has reported very low rates of TPRs leading to adoptions. In contrast, the
percentage of children who remain legal orphans after a TPR has increased
substantially. In 2005, the family court granted fifty TPR motions, and 56
percent of affected children remained legal orphans. In 2006, forty TPRs
were granted and 65 percent of affected children remained legal orphans.
In 2007, forty-seven TPRs were granted and 75 percent of affected
children remained legal orphans.276 Although one might conclude that
these TPRs did lead to a substantial number of adoptions—ranging from
25 percent in 2007 to 44 percent in 2006—the data does not provide
enough evidence to support that conclusion. In many, and probably most,
of the cases in which an adoption followed a TPR, the TPR was
adjudicated only after a prospective adoptive parent had been identified
and after the child had moved in with that individual. Those TPRs are
better considered as part of the adoption process once an adoptive parent is
identified; they are not legal actions to further adoption recruitment.
TPRs, of course, have serious implications for parents’ and children’s
fundamental constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
observed that TPRs, unlike other child custody decisions and unlike “mine
273
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Rights of Children in Foster Care— An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 132
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run civil actions,”
impose a “unique kind of deprivation.”278
Permanently and irrevocably terminating the legal relationship between a
parent and a child “involve[s] the awesome authority of the State” and TPR
orders “are among the most severe forms of state action.”279 The weight of
the right at stake, and the lack of empirical evidence suggesting that
terminating this fundamental right on a wide scale leads to positive
aggregate results, counsels strongly against using TPR trials as an allpurpose due process guarantee.
Terminating parent-child relationships is especially troublesome for
older children and youth, the group that represents two-thirds of children in
the District of Columbia’s foster care system,280 and a majority of foster
children nationally.281 Older children and youth are more likely to have
strong relationships and ongoing contact with their birth parents, siblings
and extended family members. Older children have formed a sense of
identity dependent on these relationships.
Terminating children’s
relationships with these individuals can harm their identity, and undermine
their adjustment to a new home and long-term wellbeing.282 For all of
these reasons, the older a child is when the government removes him from
his family, the less likely he is to be adopted; nationally, 38 percent of
children removed before turning one year old are later adopted, compared
to 19 percent of children removed between one year and five years old, and
less than 10 percent of children removed between six years and twelve
years old, and likely even less for older youth.283
Indeed, many states have already recognized the significant importance
277
278
279
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homes.”); David Howe, Age at Placement, Adoption Experience and Adult Adopted People’s Contact
with Their Adoptive and Birth Mothers: An Attachment Perspective, 3 ATTACHMENT AND HUM. DEV.
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of youths’ connections with their birth families, even when they cannot
reunify with their parents. That is precisely the concern underlying
guardianship statutes, which allow a child to live with a legally permanent
family while maintaining the child’s relationship with his birth family.284
The increasing variety of legal options for permanency, including
options other than adoption and which do not require TPRs, also
demonstrates the inappropriateness of using TPRs to fill the due process
donut hole. TPRs are an unnecessarily drastic remedy in the growing
proportion of cases in which children leave foster care to a legal status
other than adoption. These legal statuses—most commonly referred to as
“guardianship”285—do not terminate the parent-child relationship, thus
obviating the need to terminate parents’ legal rights, as some courts have
begun to recognize.286 In fiscal year 2008, 15 percent of children who left
foster care went to live in a permanent guardianship or to otherwise live
with a relative other than their parents.287 This reflects an increase from
the 11 percent who did so in fiscal year 1998.288
The increasing frequency of kinship care is also grounds for restraint in
using TPRs. Federal law already recognizes that states need not file TPRs
when a child is living with a relative.289 About one quarter of foster
children now live in a kinship foster home,290 following significant
increases in the 1980s and 1990s.291
Congress was slow to recognize this trend, but federal law now
recognizes and funds permanency options with relatives that do not require
TPRs. In 1997, Congress expressed some awareness of kinship foster care
but only established an advisory committee to report on it.292 More than a
decade later, Congress amended federal law in 2008 to recognize
guardianships, providing funding to states to support subsidies for kinship
284

See, e.g., Foster Children’s Guardianship Act of 2000, D.C. C ODE ANN. § 16-2381
(LexisNexis 2001) (effective Apr. 4, 2001). See also, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2389 (LexisNexis 2001)
(effective Apr. 4, 2001).
285
Id.
286

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 2009 WL 928416, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Apr. 8, 2009).
287
AFCARS 2008, supra note 160 (noting that seven percent of foster care exits were to
guardianship and eight percent to “living with other relative(s)”).
288
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.. SERV., AFCARS REPORT: FINAL ESTIMATES FOR FY 1998
THROUGH FY 2002 (2006), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report12.pdf.
289
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) (2006).
290
291

AFCARS 2008, supra note 160.

Rob Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
131, 134 (2004), available at http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/
14_01_07.pdf.
292
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 303 (1997).

60

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:1

293

guardianships, a development likely to increase the number of children
who leave foster care to guardianship.
States have also begun to expand subsidized guardianship to non-kin
for the explicit purpose of permitting foster parents to obtain permanent
custody of a foster child without terminating the child’s legal relationship
with his parents. In 2003, the Children’s Defense Fund documented
twenty-four states offering subsidized guardianship to non-kin.294 That
number is increasing; the District of Columbia has enacted legislation
expanding subsidized guardianship to non-kin.295 As this trend grows, it is
likely to eliminate the need for TPRs for tens of thousands of foster
children, including those who in present practice might be subject to a
TPR. A study of a pilot program in Illinois shows that offering subsidized
guardianship to non-kin induces many families who otherwise would have
chosen adoption to choose guardianship.296 It also helps more children
leave foster care to permanent families than offering subsidized adoption
alone. The study included a control group in which the only means for a
non-kinship foster family to obtain legal permanency was to adopt the
foster child, and an experimental group in which non-kinship foster
families could obtain legal permanency through either adoption or
guardianship. In the control group, 25.3 percent of children in non-kinship
homes were adopted, but that number was only 16.7 percent in the
experimental group.297
However, 15.8 percent of children in the
experimental group left foster care to guardianship with their foster
families. That group appears to include the 8.6 percent of children in nonkinship foster care forced into adoption (and, by legal necessity, a TPR)
when guardianship is not an option, and 7.2 percent of children in nonkinship foster care who would have remained in foster care without
guardianship as an option.298 This study provides an empirical basis for the
policy judgment of those states that offer subsidized guardianship to nonkin: a significant number of families choose that option over a legal option
that requires terminating rights, and a significant number of children, who
293
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would otherwise remain in state custody, will leave foster care to that
option.
None of this is to suggest that TPRs should never happen. TPRs can
serve important purposes in certain cases. They play a legally necessary
role in furthering an adoption (when that is appropriate). Despite the lack
of evidence that widespread TPRs meaningfully increase the chances of
finalizing an adoption, it is plausible that TPRs of certain subsets of foster
children will further adoption, such as very young children without
substantial bonds to their parents. In some rare cases, a parent may be so
dangerous that placing a child in foster care is insufficient to protect the
child, and a TPR may be necessary. But these useful purposes of TPRs are
not so widespread that they could justify their use in all cases. They
therefore are a poor choice to fill the due process donut hole.
CONCLUSION
The American abuse and neglect system has established multi-stage
legal processes to determine whether a state may use its authority to
temporarily or permanently break up a family. To respect the fundamental
constitutional rights at stake and to ensure that states only use their
authority to separate children from their parents when absolutely
necessary, judges and policymakers should pay greater attention to what
federal law calls “procedural safeguards” within this system. The
supposed safeguards that exist in the years-long middle of abuse and
neglect cases are in serious need of reform. Congress, state legislatures,
and state courts should move to require that contested permanency
planning hearings involve evidentiary hearings and factual findings, and
involve the right to appeal and have such appeals decided promptly. These
reforms will result in more accurate decision-making and better results for
children and families in foster care.

